Network Satellite ServerApplication · Redhat

CVE-2011-0718

MEDIUM · 5.8 CVSS v2.0 Published 2011-02-25
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
67/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Red Hat Network (RHN) Satellite Server 5.4 does not use a time delay after a failed login attempt, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct brute force password guessing attacks.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

RHN Satellite Server 5.4 lacks rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms on its authentication system. After failed login attempts, no time delay is imposed before allowing another attempt, enabling rapid automated password guessing via brute force attacks.

MitigationImplement account lockout policies with configurable thresholds (e.g., lock after 5 failed attempts for 30 minutes) and/or introduce progressive time delays after failed login attempts to slow brute force attacks.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Network Satellite ServerApplication
Affected:= 5.4

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
M
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify RHN Satellite Server version
    Check the installed version of Red Hat Network Satellite Server (e.g., using 'rhn-schema-version' command, /usr/bin/rhn_check, or querying the database for the server version)
    Affected if Version is confirmed to be 5.4 (or if the version cannot be determined but the product is RHN Satellite 5.4)
  2. Examine account lockout configuration
    Inspect the authentication configuration for account lockout policies. Check PAM configuration files under /etc/pam.d/ related to satellite services, or the RHN Satellite web interface under 'Administration' > 'Users' > 'User Preferences' for lockout settings.
    Affected if No account lockout policy is configured (e.g., no limit on failed attempts before lockout, or lockout duration is set to 0/disabled)
  3. Inspect rate limiting or delay settings
    Check /etc/rhn/rhn.conf or similar RHN configuration files for parameters controlling failed login attempt delays or rate limiting (e.g., 'auth_retries', 'failed_login_delay', or similar options).
    Affected if No rate limiting or progressive time delay after failed login attempts is configured or enabled
  4. Review authentication mechanism
    Examine the web UI and backend authentication configuration to confirm whether the login mechanism enforces any throttling between failed attempts.
    Affected if The system allows immediate repeated login attempts without any imposed delay or throttling after authentication failures

The environment is affected if RHN Satellite Server version 5.4 is running and no account lockout policy or login attempt rate limiting/delay mechanism is configured on the authentication system.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Implement account lockout policies with configurable thresholds (e.g., lock after 5 failed attempts for 30 minutes) and/or introduce progressive time delays after failed login attempts to slow brute force attacks.

Fix this in Network Satellite Server Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
14.0 hours of engineering $2,490
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-0718 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data