Lotus DominoApplication · Ibm

CVE-2011-0918

HIGH · 10.0 CVSS v2.0 Published 2011-02-08
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Stack-based buffer overflow in the NRouter (aka Router) service in IBM Lotus Domino allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via long filenames associated with Content-ID and ATTACH:CID headers in attachments in malformed calendar-request e-mail messages, aka SPR KLYH87LKRE.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Stack-based buffer overflow in IBM Lotus Domino's NRouter service allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via long filenames in Content-ID and ATTACH:CID headers within malformed calendar-request e-mail message attachments.

MitigationApply IBM Lotus Domino patches or upgrade to a fixed version; consider disabling or filtering calendar request processing at the network perimeter until patched.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Lotus DominoApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm IBM Lotus Domino installation
    Locate Domino installation directory (typically C:\Lotus\Domino or /opt/ibm/lotus/domino) and verify the presence of Domino executables (nrouter.exe, lotus.exe, etc.)
    Affected if IBM Lotus Domino server software is present on the system
  2. Identify Domino version
    Run 'domino -version' or check the version displayed in Domino Administrator, or read the version from the notes.ini file or Domino program directory
    Affected if Any version of IBM Lotus Domino is installed (all versions are affected)
  3. Verify NRouter service is running
    Check Windows Services (if Windows) for 'Lotus Domino Router' service status, or on Linux/Unix check running processes for nrouter process
    Affected if NRouter service is active and accepting mail connections
  4. Confirm calendar request processing is enabled
    Examine Domino server configuration document in Domino Directory (names.nsf) under Server > Configurations > Configuration Settings > Router > SMTP - check if 'Calendar processing' is enabled, or check notes.ini for CalendarServer=1
    Affected if Calendar request processing is enabled on the Domino server
  5. Check SMTP/inbound mail configuration
    Review Router/SMTP settings in Domino Directory to confirm the server accepts external SMTP mail connections
    Affected if Server accepts inbound SMTP mail (direct or via gateway)
  6. Inspect NRouter configuration for CID attachment handling
    Review router configuration files and notes.ini for ATTACH:CID and Content-ID header processing settings
    Affected if CID header processing for attachments is not explicitly disabled

The environment is affected if IBM Lotus Domino with NRouter service is installed, any version, with calendar request processing enabled and accepting inbound mail.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply IBM Lotus Domino patches or upgrade to a fixed version; consider disabling or filtering calendar request processing at the network perimeter until patched.

Fix this in Lotus Domino Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
28.0 hours of engineering $4,980
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-0918 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data