CVE-2011-2760
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBrocade BigIron RX switches allow remote attackers to bypass ACL rules by using 179 as the source port of a packet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass configured Access Control Lists (ACLs) on Brocade BigIron RX switches by crafting packets with source port 179 (the well-known BGP port). This effectively means ACL rules are not being applied correctly to packets using this source port, allowing unauthorized traffic to pass through the switch despite ACL configurations designed to filter it.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify your switch modelRun 'show version' or check the device hardware label to confirm it is a Brocade BigIron RX switchAffected if The device is a BigIron RX switch (all versions are affected)
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Review configured ACLsRun 'show access-list' or 'show ip access-list' to list all Access Control Lists configured on the switchAffected if You have ACLs configured that include rules intended to filter BGP traffic or traffic on destination port 179 (these rules may be bypassed)
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Check which ACLs are applied to interfacesRun 'show access-list interface' or 'show run interface' to see which ACLs are bound to inbound interfacesAffected if ACLs intended to filter traffic are applied to interfaces facing untrusted networks (they may not be effective for source port 179)
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Monitor for source port 179 trafficUse 'show ip bgp' or packet capture features to observe if there is any BGP traffic with source port 179 entering the switchAffected if Any BGP traffic with source port 179 is present on interfaces where ACL filtering is expected but may be bypassed
You are affected if you operate a Brocade BigIron RX switch with ACLs configured to filter BGP or port 179 traffic, as packets using source port 179 will bypass those ACLs regardless of your configuration.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate the switch firmware to a patched version if available; alternatively, implement compensating controls such as explicit ACL rules that explicitly deny or properly filter traffic with source port 179, and monitor for anomalous traffic patterns on port 179.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-2760 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-2760 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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