CVE-2011-4859
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Schneider Electric Quantum Ethernet Module, as used in the Quantum 140NOE771* and 140CPU65* modules, the Premium TSXETY* and TSXP57* modules, the M340 BMXNOE01* and BMXP3420* modules, and the STB DIO STBNIC2212 and STBNIP2* modules, uses hardcoded passwords for the (1) AUTCSE, (2) AUT_CSE, (3) fdrusers, (4) ftpuser, (5) loader, (6) nic2212, (7) nimrohs2212, (8) nip2212, (9) noe77111_v500, (10) ntpupdate, (11) pcfactory, (12) sysdiag, (13) target, (14) test, (15) USER, and (16) webserver accounts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via the (a) TELNET, (b) Windriver Debug, or (c) FTP port.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSchneider Electric Quantum Ethernet Modules used in multiple PLC product lines contain 16 hardcoded default passwords for accounts such as ftpuser, loader, USER, webserver, and others embedded in firmware. These credentials can be exploited by remote attackers via TELNET, FTP, or Windriver Debug ports to gain unauthorized administrative access to the industrial control device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 3.5<= 3.5<= 3.5<= 3.3<= 3.4<= 4.9<= 5.0<= 5.0<= 5.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Quantum Ethernet Module model numberLocate the physical device or check the device inventory/network documentation for the Ethernet module model (e.g., 140cpu65150, 140noe77100, Tsxety4103)Affected if The model matches one listed in the affected products: 140cpu65150, 140cpu65160, 140cpu65260, 140noe77100, 140noe77101, 140noe77111, Tsxety4103, or Tsxety5103
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Determine the installed firmware versionAccess the device web interface, use the PLC programming software (e.g., Unity Pro), or query the device via SNMP or the management console to retrieve the firmware versionAffected if The firmware version is at or below the affected threshold for that model (see CVE documentation for specific version limits)
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Verify if TELNET service is enabled and accessibleAttempt a TELNET connection to the device IP on port 23, or check device configuration for TELNET service statusAffected if TELNET is enabled and reachable from any network segment outside the isolated control system
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Verify if FTP service is enabled and accessibleAttempt an FTP connection to the device IP on port 21, or check device configuration for FTP service statusAffected if FTP is enabled and reachable from any network segment outside the isolated control system
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Verify if Windriver Debug port is accessibleAttempt a connection to the Windriver Debug port (typically port 9999 or as configured), or check device configuration for debug service statusAffected if The debug port is exposed on the network
The environment is affected if the device is a Quantum Ethernet Module model listed in the affected products, the installed firmware version falls within the vulnerable version ranges, and any of the services TELNET, FTP, or Windriver Debug are enabled and accessible from a network outside the isolated control system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedRestrict network exposure of affected devices, disable unused services (TELNET/FTP), contact Schneider Electric for patched firmware, and implement network segmentation to isolate industrial control systems.
No upgrade path available; legacy devices are end-of-life and unsupported
- This CVE describes a hardcoded password vulnerability in legacy Schneider Electric PLC modules.
- The affected modules (Quantum 140NOE771*, 140CPU65*, Premium TSXETY*, TSXP57*, M340 BMXNOE01*, BMXP3420*, STB DIO STBNIC2212, STBNIP2*) are from the early 2000s and are no longer supported by Schneider Electric.
- Schneider Electric has likely discontinued firmware updates for these legacy devices.
- If these devices are still in operation, they should be isolated from untrusted networks and replaced with modern, supported hardware.
- For defense-in-depth, implement network segmentation to restrict access to these devices, and monitor for unauthorized access attempts.
- Contact Schneider Electric for device-specific guidance if these systems are still in production use.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-4859 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-4859 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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