CVE-2011-5088
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe GENESIS32 IcoSetServer ActiveX control in ICONICS GENESIS32 9.21 and BizViz 9.21 configures the trusted zone on the basis of user input, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site, related to a "Workbench32/WebHMI component SetTrustedZone Policy vulnerability."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe GENESIS32 IcoSetServer ActiveX control in ICONICS GENESIS32 9.21 and BizViz 9.21 improperly configures the browser's trusted security zone based on user-supplied input. This allows a remote attacker hosting a malicious webpage to manipulate trusted zone policies, enabling arbitrary code execution in the context of the user's browser.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 9.21= 9.21CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Genesis32 or BizViz versionOpen Windows Control Panel > Programs and Features, or check the registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall for entries named 'GENESIS32' or 'BizViz'. Locate the DisplayVersion value.Affected if The DisplayVersion shows exactly 9.21 for either product
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Locate the IcoSetServer ActiveX controlSearch the Windows registry for the IcoSetServer control. Check HKCR\CLSID for a component named 'IcoSetServer' or search for files named IcoSetServer.dll in the GENESIS32 installation directory (typically C:\Program Files\ICONICS\GENESIS32 or similar).Affected if The IcoSetServer ActiveX control DLL is found on the system
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Verify ActiveX control is registered for Internet ExplorerCheck the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Code Store Database\Distribution Units or HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Ext\Settings for the IcoSetServer CLSID. Also inspect HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{CLSID}\Implemented Categories to confirm ActiveX registration.Affected if The control has an active registry entry indicating it is registered as an Internet Explorer ActiveX control
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Confirm the control is enabled in Internet Explorer security settingsOpen Internet Explorer > Tools > Internet Options > Security > Trusted Sites > Custom Level. Scroll to 'ActiveX controls and plug-ins' and check if 'Initialize and script ActiveX controls not marked as safe' is set to Enable or Prompt.Affected if The setting is Enabled or the control appears in the list of 'Allowed ActiveX controls' in the zone where the user browses
A user is affected if Genesis32 or BizViz version 9.21 is installed AND the IcoSetServer ActiveX control is registered and enabled in any Internet Explorer security zone used for browsing.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedDisable the vulnerable IcoSetServer ActiveX control in Internet Explorer security settings, or upgrade to a patched version of GENESIS32/BizViz if available. Consider network segmentation to limit exposure to this industrial software.
- Disable the IcoSetServer ActiveX control in Internet Explorer by adding the affected ICONICS DLL to the ActiveX kill bit list in Windows Registry
- Open Registry Editor (regedit.exe) and navigate to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility
- Create a new key with the CLSID for the IcoSetServer ActiveX control (consult ICONICS or US-CERT advisory for specific CLSID)
- Set the Compatibility Flags DWORD value to 0x00000400 to disable the control
- Alternatively, configure Internet Explorer security settings to disable ActiveX controls for untrusted zones
- Implement network segmentation to restrict access to systems running Genesis32/BizViz 9.21
- If possible, upgrade to a newer version of Genesis32/BizViz that addresses this vulnerability
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-5088 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-5088 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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