CVE-2011-5217
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedDirectory traversal vulnerability in the PXE Mtftp service in Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager before 08-55 Japanese and before 08-51 English allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via unknown vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceDirectory traversal vulnerability in the PXE Mtftp service of Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via traversal sequences (e.g., ../) in file requests. The flaw exists due to insufficient input validation in the Mtftp component before versions 08-55 (Japanese) and 08-51 (English).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 08-07= 08-06<= 08-50-\/b= 07-52= 07-56= 07-56-\/g\(\*2\)= 08-00<= 06-00-\/a= 01-00= 01-01= 06-00CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager installationCheck for the presence of Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager on the system. Look for installation directories named typically under 'Hitachi' or check system inventory/asset management tools for this software.Affected if The software is installed and is one of the affected versions listed.
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Determine the installed version of the productLocate the version information for Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager. This is typically available in the software's about dialog, an installer log, or a version file within the installation directory.Affected if The installed version is: Japanese versions <= 08-07, = 08-06, 07-52, 07-56, 07-56-g(*2), 08-00, or any version <= 08-54 before the 08-55 patch; English versions <= 08-50-/b, 01-00, 01-01, 06-00, or any version <= 08-50 before the 08-51 patch.
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Verify the PXE Mtftp service is enabledCheck if the PXE Mtftp service (often named 'Mtftp' or part of the DeploymentManager service suite) is installed and running. This can be done via service management tools (services.msc), command line (sc query or systemctl), or by checking the product's service configuration.Affected if The PXE Mtftp service is installed and active. The vulnerability only applies when this specific service is running.
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Check network exposure of the Mtftp serviceIdentify which network interfaces and IP addresses the Mtftp service is bound to. Use netstat, ss, or the product's network configuration to determine if the service is listening on accessible network interfaces.Affected if The Mtftp service is listening on a reachable network interface (not localhost only) and is accessible from network segments that include untrusted hosts.
A user is affected if Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager is installed with a version prior to 08-55 (Japanese) or 08-51 (English), AND the PXE Mtftp service is running and network-accessible to untrusted hosts.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Hitachi JP1/ServerConductor/DeploymentManager to version 08-55 or later (Japanese) or 08-51 or later (English). As an interim control, restrict network access to the PXE Mtftp service to trusted IP addresses only.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2011-5217 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2011-5217 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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