CVE-2012-0187
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUntrusted search path vulnerability in IBM Lotus Expeditor 6.1.x and 6.2.x before 6.2 FP5+Security Pack allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse DLL in the current working directory.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIBM Lotus Expeditor 6.1.x and 6.2.x before 6.2 FP5+Security Pack contains an untrusted search path vulnerability where the application loads DLLs from the current working directory without validating the full path. A local attacker can place a malicious DLL in a directory from which the application is launched, causing arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the affected application.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.1= 6.1.1= 6.2= 6.2.1= 6.2.2= 6.2.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify installed Lotus Expeditor versionCheck the product version through Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\IBM\Lotus\Expeditor\CurrentVersion or by locating the Expeditor executable and reviewing its properties. Also check Add/Remove Programs for the installed version.Affected if The installed version is 6.1, 6.1.1, 6.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, or 6.2.3 (versions before 6.2 FP5+Security Pack)
-
Locate the application launch pointIdentify the primary executable (typically lcbase.exe or similar in the Lotus Expeditor program directory) and determine the shortcut or script used to launch the application. Note the working directory specified in the shortcut or from which the executable is run.Affected if The application is launched from a directory where untrusted users have write access, or the current working directory is not a trusted system directory
-
Audit directory permissions in DLL search pathReview permissions on the application launch directory and all directories in the system PATH that the application may traverse. Use icacls or similar tools to list permissions, specifically checking for write access granted to non-admin or untrusted users.Affected if Any directory in the DLL search path (especially the launch directory) is writable by untrusted users, allowing them to place a malicious DLL
-
Verify DLL loading behaviorMonitor the application startup using Process Monitor (ProcMon) from Sysinternals, filtering for DLL load operations. Observe whether the application attempts to load DLLs from the current working directory without validating the full path.Affected if The application loads DLLs from the current working directory without path validation, indicated by failed DLL load attempts from the launch directory in the ProcMon log
You are affected if Lotus Expeditor version 6.1.x or 6.2.x through 6.2.3 is installed AND the application can be launched from or loads DLLs from directories writable by untrusted users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply IBM Lotus Expeditor 6.2 FP5+Security Pack or later to address this vulnerability. As a compensating control, ensure the application is launched only from trusted directories and remove write permissions from directories in the DLL search path to prevent placement of malicious DLLs.
Lotus Expeditor 6.2 FP5+Security Pack (for 6.2.x versions)
- 1. Identify the current IBM Lotus Expeditor version installed in the environment.
- 2. For Lotus Expeditor 6.2.x versions, upgrade to version 6.2 FP5 (Fix Pack 5) with Security Pack applied.
- 3. Verify the upgrade by checking the About information in the Lotus Expeditor client or using the version command-line tool.
- 4. Ensure the deployment process does not place executable files in untrusted directories to avoid similar DLL hijacking risks.
- 5. After upgrade, test critical workflows to confirm functionality is maintained.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-0187 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-0187 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data