Storageworks P2000 G3 MsaApplication · Hp

CVE-2012-0697

HIGH · 10.0 CVSS v2.0 Published 2012-01-13
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
HP StorageWorks P2000 G3 MSA array systems have a default account, which makes it easier for remote attackers to perform administrative tasks via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-4788.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

HP StorageWorks P2000 G3 MSA array systems contain a hardcoded default administrative account with predictable credentials. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain full administrative access to the storage array via network vectors, enabling them to modify configuration, access stored data, or disrupt storage services.

MitigationImmediately change or disable the default account credentials on affected P2000 G3 MSA systems. Implement network segmentation to restrict management interface access to authorized administrative hosts only.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Storageworks P2000 G3 MsaApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the storage array model
    Access the storage array management interface or check system documentation/inventory to confirm the device is an HP StorageWorks P2000 G3 MSA array system
    Affected if The device is confirmed to be an HP StorageWorks P2000 G3 MSA model
  2. Verify default administrative account status
    Log into the P2000 G3 management interface and navigate to user account management. Check if the default administrative user account (the hardcoded account referenced in this CVE) exists and is enabled
    Affected if The default administrative account is present and enabled on the system
  3. Confirm default credentials are unchanged
    Attempt to authenticate using the known default credentials associated with this CVE (the hardcoded predictable credentials). If authentication succeeds, the credentials have not been changed
    Affected if Default credentials still work and have not been modified from the vendor defaults
  4. Assess network accessibility of management interface
    Determine if the P2000 G3 management interface (typically accessible via HTTP/HTTPS on network ports) is exposed to untrusted networks or the internet. Check firewall rules and network segmentation around the storage array
    Affected if The management interface is accessible from untrusted network segments or directly from the internet

A user is affected if they operate an HP StorageWorks P2000 G3 MSA system where the hardcoded default administrative account remains enabled with unchanged credentials and the management interface is network-accessible to potential attackers.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Immediately change or disable the default account credentials on affected P2000 G3 MSA systems. Implement network segmentation to restrict management interface access to authorized administrative hosts only.

Fix this in Storageworks P2000 G3 Msa Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,440
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-0697 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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