Debian LinuxOperating system · Debian
CVE-2012-1577
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedlib/libc/stdlib/random.c in OpenBSD returns 0 when seeded with 0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceIn OpenBSD's libc implementation, the random() function returns 0 when seeded with the value 0, causing the PRNG to produce predictable zero output instead of pseudo-random values. This undermines any security-sensitive operation relying on random() for cryptographic or randomization purposes.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Debian LinuxOperating system
= 8.0= 9.0= 10.0all versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the libc implementation in useRun 'ldd --version' on Linux to check for glibc, or check if running OpenBSD with 'uname -a'. For Dietlibc, examine linked libraries with 'ldd <binary>' and look for libdietlibc or check compilation flags.Affected if The system uses OpenBSD's libc, Debian with the vulnerable libc, or Dietlibc as the C library.
-
Find applications using the random() functionSearch source code repositories or binaries for calls to random() and srandom(). Use 'grep -r "srandom" /path/to/code' or 'objdump -T /path/to/binary | grep random' on compiled binaries.Affected if Any application or service on the system calls srandom() to seed the random() function.
-
Check for seeding with value 0Examine code for srandom(0) calls or dynamic seeding where the seed value could be 0. Look for patterns like 'srandom(seed)' where seed defaults to 0 or is derived from uninitialized variables.Affected if Any code explicitly calls srandom(0) or can pass 0 as the seed value to srandom().
-
Verify OpenBSD patch statusOn OpenBSD systems, check for installed patches related to libc: 'pkg_info -L' or review /usr/src/lib/libc/gen/random.c for the seed handling fix.Affected if Running an unpatched OpenBSD version where the srandom(0) bug still exists in the libc.
You are affected if your system runs OpenBSD, Debian 8/9/10, or uses Dietlibc, AND any application or service on it seeds the random() function with the value 0, causing predictable zero output instead of pseudo-random values.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnsure applications never seed random() with 0; consider migrating to arc4random() or other cryptographically secure RNGs that handle edge cases properly; apply any available OpenBSD patches to correct the random() seed handling.
Fix this in Debian Linux
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-1577 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-1577 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data