Scadapro ClientApplication · Measuresoft

CVE-2012-1824

HIGH · 7.2 CVSS v2.0 Published 2012-05-25
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 3.3.1 or later.
See remediation →
77/100
Remediation priority · High
No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Untrusted search path vulnerability in Measuresoft ScadaPro Client before 4.0.0 and ScadaPro Server before 4.0.0 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse DLL in the current working directory.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

Untrusted search path vulnerability in Measuresoft ScadaPro allows local privilege escalation via DLL hijacking. The application loads DLLs from the current working directory without validating the full path, enabling an attacker to place a malicious DLL that gets loaded with the application's privileges.

MitigationUpdate to ScadaPro Client/Server 4.0.0 or later; ensure the application runs from a secure directory and implement safe DLL loading by specifying absolute paths and removing current directory from the search order.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Scadapro ClientApplication
Affected:<= 3.3.1
Scadapro ServerApplication
Affected:<= 3.3.1

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify ScadaPro is installed
    Check for ScadaPro installation directories, such as 'C:\Program Files\Measuresoft\ScadaPro' or registry keys under 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Measuresoft\ScadaPro'
    Affected if ScadaPro Client or Server is found on the system
  2. Determine installed ScadaPro version
    Inspect the version information of the ScadaPro executable (scadapro.exe) via right-click > Properties > Details, or use the command: dir "C:\Program Files\Measuresoft\ScadaPro\scadapro.exe"
    Affected if The version displayed is 3.3.1 or lower, or the version cannot be determined (assumed vulnerable)
  3. Identify the application startup location
    Check the shortcut or service configuration that defines the working directory for ScadaPro - look at the 'Start in' field of shortcuts or the service's working directory setting
    Affected if The working directory is a location writable by non-admin users (e.g., shared folders, user directories, or insecure install paths)
  4. Check for insecure DLL loading configuration
    Review the application configuration or environment for DLL search path settings; verify whether the current directory (.) is included in the DLL search order by analyzing the executable dependencies or using Process Monitor during startup
    Affected if The application loads DLLs from the current working directory without full path validation, or the search order includes the current directory before system directories

A user is affected if ScadaPro Client or Server version 3.3.1 or lower is installed and the application runs from or can be induced to run from a directory where an untrusted user can place a malicious DLL.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 3.3.1
Interim mitigation

Update to ScadaPro Client/Server 4.0.0 or later; ensure the application runs from a secure directory and implement safe DLL loading by specifying absolute paths and removing current directory from the search order.

Fix this in Scadapro Client Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,750
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-1824 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-1824 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data