DhcpcdApplication · Roy Marples

CVE-2012-2152

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v2.0 Published 2012-07-25
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Stack-based buffer overflow in the get_packet method in socket.c in dhcpcd 3.2.3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a long packet.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

Stack-based buffer overflow in dhcpcd 3.2.3's get_packet method in socket.c occurs when processing DHCP packets without proper length validation before copying data into a fixed-size stack buffer. A specially crafted long packet can overflow this buffer, enabling remote attackers to cause denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code.

MitigationUpgrade dhcpcd to a patched version that implements proper packet length validation in the get_packet function. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, restrict network access to trusted DHCP servers or implement network-level filtering to limit DHCP packet sizes.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
DhcpcdApplication
Affected:= 3.2.3

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if dhcpcd is installed and retrieve its version
    Run 'dhcpcd --version' or check your package manager (e.g., 'rpm -q dhcpcd', 'dpkg -l dhcpcd', 'pacman -Q dhcpcd') to determine the installed version of dhcpcd
    Affected if The installed version is exactly 3.2.3
  2. Verify dhcpcd daemon is actively running
    Check running processes for dhcpcd: 'ps aux | grep dhcpcd' or 'systemctl status dhcpcd' (or 'service dhcpcd status' on older systems)
    Affected if dhcpcd daemon is running and actively handling DHCP requests on any interface
  3. Confirm network interfaces are using dhcpcd for DHCP
    Inspect active network interfaces using DHCP: run 'ip addr show' or 'ifconfig -a' and look for interfaces in 'inet' state obtained via DHCP, or check dhcpcd runtime status with 'dhcpcd -U <interface>'
    Affected if Any network interface is configured to obtain IP addresses via dhcpcd (the vulnerable get_packet function processes incoming DHCP packets on these interfaces)
  4. Inspect dhcpcd configuration for active interfaces
    Check /etc/dhcpcd.conf and look for interface configurations, or check /var/lib/dhcpcd/ for lease files indicating active DHCP usage
    Affected if dhcpcd.conf contains active interface definitions (such as 'interface eth0') enabling DHCP client functionality

You are affected if dhcpcd version 3.2.3 is installed AND the daemon is actively running and handling DHCP requests on one or more network interfaces, triggering the vulnerable get_packet code path in socket.c.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade dhcpcd to a patched version that implements proper packet length validation in the get_packet function. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, restrict network access to trusted DHCP servers or implement network-level filtering to limit DHCP packet sizes.

Fix this in Dhcpcd Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
14.0 hours of engineering $2,380
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-2152 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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