8840tApplication · Tp Link

CVE-2012-2440

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v2.0 Published 2012-04-28
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The default configuration of the TP-Link 8840T router enables web-based administration on the WAN interface, which allows remote attackers to establish an HTTP connection and possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

The TP-Link 8840T router ships with its web-based administration interface exposed on the WAN (external network) interface in the default configuration. This allows any remote attacker on the internet to reach the router's HTTP admin login page by connecting to the router's public IP address, potentially enabling credential brute-forcing or exploitation of any underlying firmware vulnerabilities.

MitigationDisable the web-based administration interface on the WAN interface via the router's configuration panel, restricting admin access to the LAN side only. Additionally, change the default administrative credentials to a strong, unique password.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
8840tApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm router model
    Locate the router label or access the admin interface to verify the device is a TP-Link 8840T
    Affected if The device is a TP-Link 8840T router (all versions are affected)
  2. Identify WAN IP address
    Log into the router admin panel and navigate to the WAN status page to record the public IP address assigned to the router's WAN interface
    Affected if The router has a routable public IP address on its WAN interface (versus being behind another NAT device)
  3. Test WAN HTTP accessibility from external network
    From a system outside your network (such as a mobile hotspot or remote server), attempt to HTTP connect to the router's public IP address on port 80 using a web browser or curl command
    Affected if The router's web admin login page loads when accessed via the public WAN IP address, indicating WAN management is enabled and exposed
  4. Check router WAN management configuration
    Log into the router admin panel, navigate to the Security or Remote Management settings section, and verify whether the option to enable web management access from the WAN is checked or enabled
    Affected if The 'Enable Web Management' or 'Allow remote management' setting for the WAN interface is enabled in the router configuration

A defender is affected if they have a TP-Link 8840T router with a public WAN IP and either the router's web admin interface is accessible from the internet or WAN remote management is enabled in the configuration.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Disable the web-based administration interface on the WAN interface via the router's configuration panel, restricting admin access to the LAN side only. Additionally, change the default administrative credentials to a strong, unique password.

Fix this in 8840t Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation1.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
6.0 hours of engineering $1,060
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-2440 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-2440 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data