CVE-2012-3006
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Innominate mGuard Smart HW before HW-101130 and BD before BD-101030, mGuard industrial RS, mGuard delta HW before HW-103060 and BD before BD-211010, mGuard PCI, mGuard blade, and EAGLE mGuard appliances with software before 7.5.0 do not use a sufficient source of entropy for private keys, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof (1) HTTPS or (2) SSH servers by predicting a key value.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe mGuard appliance family uses a weak random number generator with insufficient entropy for private key generation. This affects both HTTPS and SSH services, allowing attackers to predict key values and perform man-in-the-middle attacks. The vulnerability stems from the underlying entropy source, not just the cryptographic algorithm.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 7.5.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify mGuard firmware versionAccess the device management interface or check the system information page to view the currently installed firmware version. This is typically found under 'System' > 'Status' or 'System' > 'Information' in the web UI.Affected if The installed firmware version is below 7.5.0 (or below the hardware-specific patched version) - this confirms the device uses the weak random number generator.
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Verify HTTPS management service is enabledCheck the device configuration for the HTTPS management interface status. This is usually found under 'Network' > 'Interfaces' or 'Administration' > 'Access' settings in the mGuard web interface.Affected if HTTPS service is enabled on an affected firmware version - this means the weak entropy source could have been used for the HTTPS private key.
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Verify SSH service is enabledCheck the device configuration for SSH access settings. Look for SSH daemon configuration or remote access settings in the web UI under 'Network' > 'Services' or similar sections.Affected if SSH service is enabled on an affected firmware version - this indicates the weak entropy source could have been used for the SSH private key.
The device is affected if the firmware version is below 7.5.0 (or the relevant hardware-specific patched version) and either HTTPS or SSH services have been used, as both rely on privately generated keys that may be predictable due to insufficient entropy.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data7.5.0
Regenerate all private keys on affected devices after updating to the patched software version (7.5.0 or later, or hardware-specific versions HW-101130/BD-101030, HW-103060/BD-211010). Apply firmware updates in a controlled manner, ensuring proper entropy sources are used for new key generation.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-3006 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-3006 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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