CVE-2012-3052
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUntrusted search path vulnerability in Cisco VPN Client 5.0 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse DLL in the current working directory, aka Bug ID CSCua28747.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Cisco VPN Client 5.0 contains an untrusted search path vulnerability where the application loads DLLs from the current working directory without validation. A local attacker can place a malicious DLL with the same expected filename in a directory from which a victim launches the VPN client, causing arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running the client.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 5.0= 5.0.01= 5.0.01.0600= 5.0.2= 5.0.02.0090= 5.0.2.0090= 5.0.03.0530= 5.0.03.0560= 5.0.04.0300= 5.0.5= 5.0.05.0290= 5.0.6CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Cisco VPN Client versionOpen Windows Control Panel, navigate to Programs and Features, or right-click the Cisco VPN Client executable and select Properties to view the version informationAffected if The displayed version matches any of these: 5.0, 5.0.01, 5.0.01.0600, 5.0.2, 5.0.02.0090, 5.0.2.0090, 5.0.03.0530, 5.0.03.0560, 5.0.04.0300, 5.0.5, 5.0.05.0290, or 5.0.6
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Determine typical launch directory for VPN ClientNote the directory from which you or your users normally launch the Cisco VPN Client executableAffected if The application is launched from a directory that is writable by other users, such as Downloads, Desktop, or shared network folders
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Inspect launch directory for unexpected DLL filesList all DLL files present in the directory from which the VPN Client is launched using 'dir *.dll' command in that directoryAffected if Any unknown or unexpected DLL files exist in the launch directory that were not installed as part of the VPN Client installation
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Check PATH environment variable for vulnerable directory placementReview the system PATH and user PATH to see if directories where untrusted users can write appear before or in the same list as VPN Client directoriesAffected if Writable directories like Downloads, temp folders, or shared network paths are accessible to other local or network users and are used as working directories when launching the VPN Client
You are affected if the installed Cisco VPN Client version matches any of the listed affected versions AND the application can be launched from a directory where untrusted users can place files.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUsers should launch the Cisco VPN Client only from trusted, non-writable directories and avoid running it from locations like Downloads or shared network folders where untrusted users can place files. Organizations should ensure the application is launched from a clean, controlled directory path.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-3052 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-3052 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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