CVE-2012-3493
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe command_give_request_ad function in condor_startd.V6/command.cpp Condor 7.6.x before 7.6.10 and 7.8.x before 7.8.4 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information, and possibly control or start arbitrary jobs, via a ClassAd request to the condor_startd port, which leaks the ClaimId.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn HTCondor (condor_startd), the command_give_request_ad function in versions 7.6.x before 7.6.10 and 7.8.x before 7.8.4 leaks the ClaimId in ClassAd responses to the condor_startd port. The ClaimId is a sensitive authentication token that, if obtained by an attacker, can allow them to control or submit arbitrary jobs to the affected startd daemon.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.6.0= 7.6.1= 7.6.2= 7.6.3= 7.6.4= 7.6.5= 7.6.6= 7.6.7= 7.6.8= 7.6.9= 7.8.0= 7.8.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify installed HTCondor versionRun `condor_version` or `condor_q -version` to obtain the installed HTCondor version numberAffected if The version shown is 7.6.0 through 7.6.9, or 7.8.0 through 7.8.1, or any 7.8.x version before 7.8.4
-
Confirm condor_startd daemon is runningRun `condor_status -startd` or check for the condor_startd process with `ps aux | grep condor_startd`Affected if The condor_startd daemon is active and accessible on the network
-
Check if ClassAd queries are acceptedUse `condor_status -long` or query the startd port directly to see if ClassAd responses are returned. The default startd port is 9618.Affected if ClassAd queries return information without requiring authentication, exposing potential ClaimId leakage
-
Verify network exposure of startd portCheck firewall rules or listening ports with `netstat -anp | grep 9618` or `ss -tlnp | grep 9618`Affected if The condor_startd port is reachable from untrusted network segments
If the installed HTCondor version is 7.6.0-7.6.9 or 7.8.0-7.8.1 and the condor_startd port accepts unauthenticated ClassAd queries, the ClaimId may be exposed to unauthorized requesters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade HTCondor to version 7.6.10 or 7.8.4 or later. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict network access to the condor_startd port using firewall rules or authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized ClassAd requests.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,512.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-3493 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-3493 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data