CVE-2012-3811
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in ImageUpload.ashx in the Wallboard application in Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter 7.0 before 7.0.5.8 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release and 8.0 before 8.0.9.13 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by uploading an executable file and then accessing it via a direct request.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in ImageUpload.ashx in Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter's Wallboard application allows remote unauthenticated attackers to upload executable files (e.g., ASP webshells) and execute them via direct HTTP requests, achieving arbitrary code execution on the affected server.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.0= 8.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter versionCheck the application version through the software inventory, about page, or registry entries typically used by Avaya installation toolsAffected if Version is 7.0 or 8.0 (unpatched)
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Locate ImageUpload.ashx in the Wallboard web applicationSearch the web application directory for ImageUpload.ashx, commonly found under the Wallboard or CallReporter web folder pathAffected if ImageUpload.ashx file exists in the web-accessible directory
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Verify Wallboard application is exposed via HTTP/HTTPSAttempt to access the Wallboard application URL endpoint (typically /Wallboard/ or /CallReporter/) from the server or a test clientAffected if Wallboard application is accessible over the network
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Test file upload endpoint accessibilitySend a direct HTTP request to the ImageUpload.ashx endpoint using a tool like curl or browser developer tools, observing if the endpoint responds without authenticationAffected if ImageUpload.ashx accepts requests without requiring authentication
The environment is affected if Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter versions 7.0 or 8.0 are installed AND the Wallboard application with its ImageUpload.ashx component is exposed and accessible without authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor patches 7.0.5.8 (for v7.0) or 8.0.9.13 (for v8.0) or later. If immediate patching is not feasible, disable or restrict access to the ImageUpload.ashx endpoint and implement strict file type validation with uploaded files stored outside web-accessible directories.
7.0.5.8 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release (for 7.0.x) or 8.0.9.13 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release (for 8.0.x)
- 1. Identify the current version of Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter by checking the application or system information
- 2. Access the Avaya support portal at downloads.avaya.com or contact Avaya support to obtain the fixed maintenance release
- 3. For version 7.0.x systems: upgrade to 7.0.5.8 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release or later
- 4. For version 8.0.x systems: upgrade to 8.0.9.13 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release or later
- 5. Follow Avaya's standard upgrade documentation for IP Office Customer Call Reporter, ensuring proper backup of configuration and data before upgrading
- 6. After upgrade, verify the ImageUpload.ashx handler now properly validates uploaded files and restricts executable content
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-3811 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-3811 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data