CVE-2012-6428
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Carlo Gavazzi EOS-Box stores hard-coded passwords in the PHP file of the device. By using the hard-coded passwords, attackers can log into the device with administrative privileges. This could allow the attacker to have unauthorized access.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Carlo Gavazzi EOS-Box stores hard-coded passwords directly in PHP files on the device firmware. Attackers who obtain these credentials (which are static and cannot be changed by users) can authenticate to the device's web interface with administrative privileges, achieving full unauthorized control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.0.0all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Carlo Gavazzi EOS-Box device on the networkPerform a network scan for devices responding on HTTP (port 80) or HTTPS (port 443) and look for web page titles or favicons mentioning 'Carlo Gavazzi', 'EOS-Box', or 'Photovoltaic Monitoring'. Check device MAC OUI for manufacturer signatures if available.Affected if A Carlo Gavazzi EOS-Box photovoltaic monitoring device is present on the network.
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Determine the firmware versionAccess the device web interface and navigate to the System Information, Status, or About page typically found in admin/settings menus. Alternatively, if you have extracted the firmware binary, search for version strings using binwalk, strings, or a hex editor.Affected if The firmware version is 1.0.0 or lower, or the device is confirmed to be an EOS-Box Photovoltaic Monitoring System of any version.
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Extract and inspect firmware for PHP filesIf you can obtain the firmware file (from manufacturer downloads or device extraction), decompress it and search for .php files. Use grep or strings to search within PHP files for patterns like 'password', 'passwd', or hardcoded string literals.Affected if PHP files in the firmware contain hardcoded password strings or credentials that are not derived from user configuration.
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Verify credentials are user-changeableAttempt to locate password change functionality in the device web interface under Admin, Settings, or User Management sections. Check if the interface allows changing the administrative password or if credentials remain static.Affected if The device does not provide a mechanism to change the administrative password, or the same hardcoded credentials persist after attempting to change them.
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Test for unauthorized admin accessAttempt to authenticate to the device web interface using known default credentials or credentials extracted from firmware analysis. Verify if authentication succeeds with administrative privileges.Affected if Authentication succeeds with hardcoded credentials giving full administrative control without any user-set password.
A Carlo Gavazzi EOS-Box device with firmware version 1.0.0 or lower, or any version of the EOS-Box Photovoltaic Monitoring System where the administrative password cannot be changed and is hardcoded in PHP files, is affected by CVE-2012-6428.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply any available firmware updates to remove hard-coded credentials; immediately change default passwords if user-settable; network-segment or firewall the device to limit exposure; disable remote management if not required.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2012-6428 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2012-6428 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data