CVE-2013-1192
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe JAR files on Cisco Device Manager for Cisco MDS 9000 devices before 5.2.8, and Cisco Device Manager for Cisco Nexus 5000 devices, allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on Windows client machines via a crafted element-manager.jnlp file, aka Bug IDs CSCty17417 and CSCty10802.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a client-side code execution vulnerability in Cisco Device Manager for MDS 9000 and Nexus 5000 switches. Attackers craft malicious element-manager.jnlp files that reference trojaned JAR files, allowing arbitrary command execution on Windows client machines when users launch the Cisco Device Manager application. This is a Java Web Start (JNLP) deserialization attack where the client trusts and executes malicious code packaged within the JAR files.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 5.2.5= 5.0.1= 5.0.2= 5.0.4= 5.0.5= 5.0.6= 5.0.7= 5.0.8= 5.0.9= 5.1.1= 5.1.2= 5.2.1all versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if Cisco Device Manager is installedOn Windows, check for Cisco Device Manager in Add/Remove Programs, or search for 'Cisco Device Manager' in the Start menu. Also check common installation paths like C:\Program Files\Cisco\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco\Affected if Cisco Device Manager application is present on the client machine
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Determine installed Cisco Device Manager versionOpen Cisco Device Manager, then go to Help > About, or check the version listed in Add/Remove Programs. The version number will be in the format X.Y.Z (for example, 5.2.1)Affected if The installed version matches any of the affected versions: <= 5.2.5, = 5.0.1, = 5.0.2, = 5.0.4, = 5.0.5, = 5.0.6, = 5.0.7, = 5.0.8, = 5.0.9, = 5.1.1, = 5.1.2, = 5.2.1, or if it is any version of Nexus 5000/5010/5020/5548p/5548up device manager
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Check for Java Web Start usageLook for .jnlp files related to Cisco Device Manager on the system. Check the Cisco Device Manager installation directory for element-manager.jnlp or similar JNLP files. Also verify if Java Web Start (javaws.exe) is enabled on the clientAffected if Java Web Start is enabled and .jnlp files from Cisco Device Manager can be launched
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Inspect JNLP file integrityIf Cisco Device Manager is installed, locate any .jnlp files in the installation folder or downloaded from network devices. Examine them for unexpected or suspicious JAR file references, especially URLs pointing to untrusted locationsAffected if The JNLP files reference external or modified JAR files from untrusted sources
The client is affected if Cisco Device Manager is installed with an affected version AND Java Web Start is used to launch .jnlp files that could load malicious JAR content
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Cisco Device Manager to version 5.2.8 or later for MDS 9000 devices, and apply any available patches for Nexus 5000 devices. Additionally, instruct users to avoid opening untrusted JNLP files and consider disabling Java Web Start if not required for legitimate device management.
Cisco Device Manager version 5.2.8 or later for MDS 9000; contact Cisco for Nexus 5000 specific fixed version
- 1. Identify the currently installed Cisco Device Manager version by accessing the device management interface or checking the software documentation.
- 2. For MDS 9000 devices: Upgrade Cisco Device Manager to version 5.2.8 or later.
- 3. For Nexus 5000 devices: Contact Cisco Technical Support to obtain the specific fixed version of Cisco Device Manager for Nexus 5000 series.
- 4. Download the updated Device Manager from the Cisco Software Download center (software.cisco.com) using valid service contract credentials.
- 5. Uninstall the current Device Manager from affected Windows client machines.
- 6. Install the upgraded Device Manager version on client machines.
- 7. Verify the version installed matches the fixed release (5.2.8 or later for MDS; confirmed fixed version for Nexus).
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-1192 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-1192 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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