CVE-2013-1319
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMicrosoft Publisher 2003 SP3 does not properly check the return value of an unspecified method, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Publisher file, aka "Publisher Return Value Handling Vulnerability."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMicrosoft Publisher 2003 SP3 fails to properly validate the return value from an unspecified method. When a user opens a maliciously crafted .pub file, this improper return value handling allows memory corruption, enabling arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the targeted user.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2003CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Microsoft Publisher 2003 is installedOpen Control Panel > Programs and Features, look for Microsoft Office 2003 or Microsoft Publisher 2003 in the installed programs list. Alternatively, check registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\MSPUB.EXEAffected if Microsoft Publisher 2003 appears in installed programs or the MSPUB.EXE registry key exists
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Confirm the exact Publisher 2003 versionLocate MSPUB.EXE (typically in C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office11\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office11\), right-click and select Properties, then check the Details tab for the File VersionAffected if File version shows 2003 (any build) with Service Pack 3 indicated or the build matches the vulnerable release
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Check .pub file association with PublisherRight-click any .pub file in Windows Explorer, select Properties, and verify the 'Opens with' field points to Microsoft PublisherAffected if The .pub file type is associated with Microsoft Publisher 2003, meaning the vulnerable code path can be triggered when such files are opened
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Determine if user routinely handles untrusted .pub filesReview email gateway filters, attachment handling policies, or user workflow documentation to see if .pub files from external sources are commonly received and openedAffected if Users in the environment open or process .pub files from untrusted or external sources, enabling the attack vector
You are affected if Microsoft Publisher 2003 is installed and users in your environment open .pub files, as the vulnerability is triggered when a malicious .pub file is processed by the vulnerable version.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedDo not open untrusted or unexpected Publisher files. Upgrade from Microsoft Publisher 2003 to a supported, patched version of Microsoft Office. Implement email/attachment filtering to block unsolicited .pub files and consider deploying Office sandboxing or the Microsoft Office File Validation add-in.
Microsoft 365, Office 2019, or Office 2021 (any current supported Office version with Publisher component)
- Upgrade to a supported version of Microsoft Office that includes Publisher, such as Microsoft 365, Office 2019, or Office 2021
- Ensure the new Office installation receives regular security updates through Windows Update or your organization's patch management system
- Avoid opening untrusted Publisher files (.pub) from unknown or unverified sources as an additional security measure
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-1319 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-1319 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data