CVE-2013-2269
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Sponsorship Confirmation functionality in Aruba Networks ClearPass 5.x, 6.0.1, and 6.0.2, and Amigopod/ClearPass Guest 3.0 through 3.9.7, allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions and approve a request by sending a guest request, then using "parameter manipulation" in conjunction with information from a "default holding page" to discover the link that is used for sponsor approval of the guest request, then performing a direct request to that link.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Sponsorship Confirmation functionality in Aruba ClearPass and Amigopod/ClearPass Guest contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability combined with information disclosure. Remote attackers can submit a guest request, then use parameter manipulation alongside information exposed on a default holding page to discover and directly access the sponsor approval link, bypassing intended access restrictions and allowing unauthorized approval of guest requests.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 5.0.1= 5.1= 5.2= 6.0.1= 6.0.2= 3.0= 3.1= 3.2= 3.3= 3.5= 3.7= 3.9CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed ClearPass versionAccess the ClearPass administration UI or check the system version via CLI (show version or similar system information command). Compare the version number to the affected list: ClearPass 5.0.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.0.1, 6.0.2 or ClearPass Guest 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9.Affected if The installed version matches any of the listed affected versions.
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Confirm guest sponsorship functionality is enabledIn the ClearPass admin interface, navigate to Guest Manager or sponsorship configuration settings. Verify that the sponsor approval workflow is active and that guest accounts require sponsor confirmation.Affected if Guest sponsorship/approval workflow is enabled and accessible to external users.
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Inspect the guest request holding pageSubmit a test guest request and examine the default holding page or confirmation page presented to the requester. Look for any URLs, links, or parameters that expose sponsor approval endpoints or contain predictable identifiers.Affected if The holding page exposes internal approval URLs, sponsor links, or predictable parameters that could be manipulated.
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Test sponsor approval endpoint authorizationAfter submitting a guest request, attempt to access or manipulate sponsor approval parameters (such as request IDs, tokens, or approval URLs) from an unauthorized account or unauthenticated context. Observe whether the system properly validates authorization before granting approval.Affected if The approval endpoint allows unauthorized access through parameter manipulation without proper authorization checks.
You are affected if your ClearPass version matches one of the listed affected versions AND the guest sponsorship approval feature is exposed, with the holding page revealing approval URLs or the approval endpoint lacking proper authorization validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper authorization validation on all sponsor approval endpoints to ensure the requester is legitimately authorized to approve, and remove or obscure predictable/hidden links from the holding page that expose internal approval URLs.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-2269 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-2269 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data