CVE-2013-2762
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Schneider Electric Magelis XBT HMI controller has a default password for authentication of configuration uploads, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via crafted configuration data.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Schneider Electric Magelis XBT HMI controller ships with a hardcoded default password for authentication of configuration uploads. Attackers with knowledge of this default credential can bypass access restrictions and upload crafted malicious configuration data to the device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Magelis XBT HMI devices on the networkReview your network inventory or use network scanning to locate Schneider Electric Magelis XBT HMI controllers. Check device documentation or management interfaces for model identification.Affected if Any Schneider Electric Magelis XBT HMI device is present in the environment
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Verify if default credentials have been changedAccess the device configuration panel through its web interface or management software. Navigate to the authentication or user settings. Check whether the password has been modified from the factory default.Affected if The device still uses the factory default password for configuration uploads
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Review device network accessibilityCheck firewall rules and network segmentation to determine if the HMI device management interface is accessible from untrusted networks or the internet.Affected if The device management interface is exposed to untrusted networks without compensating controls
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Check authentication logs for unknown access attemptsReview device or network authentication logs for any unauthorized configuration upload attempts using the default credential pattern.
Your environment is affected if you have any Schneider Electric Magelis XBT HMI devices that still retain the factory default password for authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataChange the default password to a strong, unique credential before deploying the HMI in production and implement network segmentation to restrict unauthorized access to the controller.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-2762 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-2762 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data