CVE-2013-2782
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSchneider Electric Trio J-Series License Free Ethernet Radio with firmware 3.6.0 through 3.6.3 uses the same AES encryption key across different customers' installations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of this key from another installation.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Schneider Electric Trio J-Series License Free Ethernet Radio firmware versions 3.6.0 through 3.6.3 contains a hardcoded AES encryption key that is identical across all customer installations. This critical key management flaw allows any attacker who obtains the key from one installation to decrypt traffic from ALL other installations using affected devices, completely defeating the cryptographic protection mechanism.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 00002dh0= 00002eh0= 01002dh0= 01002eh0= 05002dh0= 05002eh0= 06002dh0= 06002eh0= 3.6.0= 3.6.1= 3.6.2= 3.6.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelAccess the device management interface or check the physical device label for the model number. Confirm it is a Schneider Electric Tburjr900 variant (e.g., model codes 00002dh0, 00002eh0, 01002dh0, 01002eh0, 05002dh0, 05002eh0, 06002dh0, or 06002eh0).Affected if The device model matches any of the Tburjr900 variants listed.
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Determine the installed firmware versionLog into the device web interface or CLI and locate the firmware version information. Common paths: System Info page, About section, or using the 'show version' command.Affected if The firmware version is 3.6.0, 3.6.1, 3.6.2, or 3.6.3.
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Verify encryption is enabledAccess the device configuration settings and check the encryption or security settings. Look for AES encryption configuration, VPN settings, or security profile settings.Affected if AES encryption or any cryptographic protection is configured and active on the device.
If the device is a Tburjr900 variant running firmware 3.6.0 through 3.6.3 and has encryption enabled, the environment is affected by this hardcoded key vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataContact Schneider Electric for a firmware patch that implements unique per-installation AES keys. Apply the vendor-provided update to all affected Trio J-Series devices and verify that encryption is functioning correctly with unique keys per installation.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-2782 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-2782 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data