CVE-2013-2784
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedTriangle Research International (aka Tri) Nano-10 PLC devices with firmware before r81 use an incorrect algorithm for bounds checking of data in Modbus/TCP packets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (networking outage) via a crafted packet to TCP port 502.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceTriangle Research International Nano-10 PLC devices with firmware before r81 contain an incorrect bounds-checking algorithm for Modbus/TCP packet data. Remote attackers can send crafted packets to TCP port 502 causing a denial of service that results in networking outage.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= r80all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Nano-10 PLC firmware versionAccess the PLC management interface or use the vendor-provided configuration tool to retrieve the current firmware version string. Compare the version to the r81 baseline.Affected if The firmware version is r80 or earlier, or if the version cannot be determined but is known to be before r81.
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Verify Modbus/TCP service is activeCheck if the PLC is listening on TCP port 502. Use a network port scanner (such as nmap) or the command 'netstat -an | grep 502' on the PLC or adjacent network device to detect an open port 502.Affected if The Modbus/TCP service is enabled and listening on TCP port 502.
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Confirm network accessibility of port 502Determine if TCP port 502 is reachable from network segments that contain untrusted or external systems. Review firewall rules, ACLs, or network boundary configurations that control access to the PLC.Affected if TCP port 502 is exposed to networks outside the trusted administrative or control network segment.
The environment is affected if the Nano-10 PLC runs firmware r80 or earlier AND has Modbus/TCP enabled on an accessible TCP port 502.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Nano-10 PLC firmware to r81 or later. If immediate patching is not feasible, implement network segmentation and firewall controls to restrict unauthorized access to TCP port 502.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-2784 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-2784 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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