CVE-2013-3061
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe ISHMED-PATRED_TRANSACT_RFCCALL function in the IS-H Industry-Specific Component Hospital subsystem in SAP Healthcare Industry Solution, and the SAP ERP central component (aka ECC 6), allows remote authenticated users to bypass intended transaction restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe ISHMED-PATRED_TRANSACT_RFCCALL function in SAP's IS-H healthcare subsystem (and ECC 6) allows authenticated users to bypass intended transaction restrictions by directly invoking the RFC function module, circumventing standard transaction code (S_TCODE) authorization checks. This is a classic function-level authorization bypass where the RFC-enabled function does not perform proper authorization validation before executing privileged operations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the vulnerable RFC function module existsUse transaction SE37 (Function Builder) or SE80 (Object Navigator) to search for function module PATRED_TRANSACT_RFCCALL or check if it exists in function group ISHMED_PATRED. Use RFC_FUNCTION_MODULE_EXISTS or check table TFDIR.Affected if The function module PATRED_TRANSACT_RFCCALL exists in the system.
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Verify if the function module is RFC-enabledIn SE37, display the function module and check the 'Remote-Enabled' checkbox in the attributes. Alternatively, query table TFTIR or use transaction SM37 to check for remote-enabled function modules.Affected if The function module is marked as remote-enabled (RFC-callable).
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Check S_RFC authorization for the function moduleUse transaction SUIM (User Information System) or SU53 after attempting access. Check authorization object S_RFC with activity 16 (Execute) for the specific RFC function. Query table USR04 or AGR_1251 for role assignments.Affected if Users or roles have S_RFC authorization with execute (16) for the function module or its function group.
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Identify users with RFC access to the vulnerable functionUse transaction SUIM > Users by Authorization Value. Select S_RFC and search for the function module name PATRED_TRANSACT_RFCCALL. Also check table USR01 and user master records for assigned roles.Affected if Any authenticated user has RFC-level execute authorization (S_RFC activity 16) for this function module.
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Confirm transaction code authorization bypass conditionThis vulnerability allows execution via RFC without S_TCODE (transaction code) authorization check. Review if the function module performs internal AUTHORITY-CHECK for S_TCODE. Use SE37 to view source code of the function module.Affected if The function module does not perform AUTHORITY-CHECK for S_TCODE before executing privileged operations, allowing authenticated RFC callers to bypass transaction restrictions.
A user is affected if the PATRED_TRANSACT_RFCCALL function module exists, is RFC-enabled, and users have S_RFC execute authorization without proper S_TCODE authorization checks enforced within the function module itself.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement and enforce proper authorization checks within the RFC function module (using AUTHORITY-CHECK for S_TCODE and relevant business object authorizations), disable unnecessary RFC exposure of privileged functions, and review transaction code assignments for the affected roles.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-3061 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3061 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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