Unified Communications ManagerApplication · Cisco

CVE-2013-3450

MEDIUM · 6.8 CVSS v2.0 Published 2013-08-05
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
77/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the User WebDialer page in Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Unified CM) allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of arbitrary users for requests that dial calls, aka Bug ID CSCui13028.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

CSRF vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager's User WebDialer allows remote attackers to trick authenticated users into unknowingly initiating phone calls. The attacker crafts malicious requests that the victim's browser sends while authenticated, exploiting the lack of proper CSRF token validation on the WebDialer endpoint.

MitigationEnable anti-CSRF protections (synchronizer tokens) on the WebDialer functionality and validate request origin/referer headers; apply Cisco's official patch for Unified CM when available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Unified Communications ManagerApplication
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
M
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Verify WebDialer service status
    Log into Cisco Unified Communications Manager Administration, go to System > Service Parameters, select the server and verify if the WebDialer service (Cisco Web Dialer) is enabled and running.
    Affected if WebDialer service is enabled and running on the CUCM server
  2. Check WebDialer configuration for CSRF token validation
    Access the WebDialer configuration files (typically in /usr/local/platform/conf or via the Cisco Unified OS Administration interface) and examine the webdialer.properties or related configuration for the presence of CSRF token validation settings.
    Affected if CSRF token (synchronizer token) validation is not configured or is disabled in WebDialer settings
  3. Inspect request origin and referer header validation
    Examine the WebDialer servlet or application configuration for validateOrigin or validateReferer settings. These should be enabled to prevent CSRF attacks.
    Affected if Origin/referer header validation is not enabled in the WebDialer endpoint configuration
  4. Review WebDialer endpoint authentication mechanism
    Check the WebDialer makeCall.jsp or equivalent servlet to determine if requests to the makeCall endpoint include and validate anti-CSRF tokens on each request.
    Affected if The WebDialer makeCall endpoint does not require valid CSRF tokens for incoming requests

A user is affected if WebDialer is enabled and the CSRF protection mechanisms (synchronizer tokens and origin/referer validation) are not properly configured or enabled.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Enable anti-CSRF protections (synchronizer tokens) on the WebDialer functionality and validate request origin/referer headers; apply Cisco's official patch for Unified CM when available.

Fix this in Unified Communications Manager Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
10.0 hours of engineering $1,780
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Scan for this in your stack

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dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3450 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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