CVE-2013-3496
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedInfotecs ViPNet Client 3.2.10 (15632) and earlier, ViPNet Coordinator 3.2.10 (15632) and earlier, ViPNet Personal Firewall 3.1 and earlier, and ViPNet SafeDisk 4.1 (0.5643) and earlier use weak permissions (Everyone: Full Control) for a folder under %PROGRAMFILES%\Infotecs, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse (1) executable file or (2) DLL file.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe ViPNet products (Client, Coordinator, Personal Firewall, SafeDisk) are installed with overly permissive NTFS ACLs on their program folder, granting 'Everyone: Full Control'. This allows any local user to write or replace executable files and DLLs in the installation directory, enabling privilege escalation to the level of the affected services.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 3.2.10<= 3.2.10<= 3.1<= 4.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check if ViPNet products are installedLook for the presence of the folder %PROGRAMFILES%\Infotecs or %PROGRAMFILES(x86)%\Infotecs using File Explorer or command: dir /ad "C:\Program Files\Infotecs" 2>nulAffected if The Infotecs folder exists, indicating ViPNet products may be installed
-
Identify installed ViPNet product versionCheck the version of the installed executable, such as VIPNET.Client.exe or Coordinator.exe located in the Infotecs program folder. Right-click the executable, select Properties, and view the Version tabAffected if The installed version is <= 3.2.10 for Client/Coordinator, <= 3.1 for Personal Firewall, or <= 4.1 for SafeDisk
-
Verify NTFS permissions on Infotecs program folderRight-click the %PROGRAMFILES%\Infotecs folder, select Properties, go to the Security tab, and examine the permissions listed for each user or groupAffected if The 'Everyone' group is listed with Full Control, Modify, or Write permissions
-
Confirm Everyone:FullControl ACL entryFrom the Security tab, double-click on Everyone and verify that the Allow column shows Full Control, or run: icacls "C:\Program Files\Infotecs" | findstr /i "Everyone"Affected if The output shows Everyone with (F) Full Control or any write-enabled permissions
If ViPNet is installed at a vulnerable version AND the Infotecs folder grants Everyone Full Control or write permissions, the environment is affected by this privilege escalation vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemediate by correcting the folder permissions under %PROGRAMFILES%\Infotecs to remove the Everyone: Full Control permission and apply restrictive ACLs following least-privilege principles, then verify ViPNet services function correctly.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,696.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-3496 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3496 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data