CVE-2013-3581
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedajax.cgi in the web interface on the Choice Wireless Green Packet WIXFMR-111 4G WiMax modem allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via an Ajax (1) wmxState or (2) netState request.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe ajax.cgi script in the web interface of the Choice Wireless Green Packet WIXFMR-111 4G WiMax modem contains two unprotected Ajax endpoints (wmxState and netState) that return sensitive system information to any remote requester without authentication. This information disclosure could include device configuration, network state, or other operational details.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelAccess the web interface of the device and check the model/version information typically displayed on the login page or status page, or use network fingerprinting to identify the device typeAffected if The device is a Choice Wireless Green Packet WIXFMR-111 4G WiMax modem
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Confirm web interface accessibilityAttempt to access the device's web interface (typically on port 80 or 443) from a network locationAffected if The web interface is reachable on the network
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Test the wmxState endpointSend an HTTP GET request to http://<device_ip>/ajax.cgi?action=wmxState without providing any authentication credentialsAffected if The request returns system information (such as device state, configuration, or network details) without requiring a login session
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Test the netState endpointSend an HTTP GET request to http://<device_ip>/ajax.cgi?action=netState without providing any authentication credentialsAffected if The request returns network-related information (such as connection status, IP addresses, or routing details) without requiring a login session
If you have a Choice Wireless WIXFMR-111 device with its web interface exposed and either the wmxState or netState endpoint returns sensitive information without authentication, your environment is affected by CVE-2013-3581.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince this is an end-of-life embedded device with no available firmware patch, mitigate by isolating the device on a restricted network segment via firewall/ACL rules that block external access to the web interface, or by retiring the device if replacement is feasible.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-3581 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3581 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data