CVE-2013-3608
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe web interface in the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) implementation on Supermicro H8DC*, H8DG*, H8SCM-F, H8SGL-F, H8SM*, X7SP*, X8DT*, X8SI*, X9DAX-*, X9DB*, X9DR*, X9QR*, X9SBAA-F, X9SC*, X9SPU-F, and X9SR* devices allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters, as demonstrated by the IP address field in config_date_time.cgi.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAuthenticated command injection in Supermicro IPMI web interface (config_date_time.cgi). Remote attackers with valid IPMI credentials can inject shell metacharacters into the IP address field to execute arbitrary OS commands on the underlying BMC firmware.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Supermicro server modelCheck the server hardware model number via BMC web interface, BIOS, or physical label. Look for model numbers: H8dcl-6f, H8dcl-If, H8dct-Hibqf, H8dct-Hln4f, H8dct-Ibqf, H8dg6-F, H8dgg-Qf, or H8dgi-F.Affected if The server model matches one of the eight affected Supermicro H8d* models listed in the CVE.
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Confirm IPMI/BMC firmware is presentAccess the IPMI web interface by browsing to the IPMI IP address (commonly on port 443 or 80). Log in and check the firmware version information typically found under 'Maintenance', 'Firmware Update', or 'Information' sections.Affected if IPMI firmware is present and the web interface is accessible on the network.
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Verify the web-based management interface is enabledCheck the BMC configuration via IPMI web interface or command line (ipmitool) for web server settings. Ensure the HTTP/HTTPS web interface service is running and accessible.Affected if The IPMI web interface (config_date_time.cgi) is accessible and not disabled.
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Check for valid IPMI credentialsReview credential inventories or test against the IPMI login page. Determine if default or weak credentials may be in use.Affected if Valid IPMI user credentials exist that could be used to authenticate to the web interface.
You are affected if you run any of the eight listed Supermicro H8d* models with IPMI firmware, have the web interface accessible, and possess valid IPMI credentials - since all versions of these models are vulnerable to command injection via the config_date_time.cgi IP address field.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Supermicro BMC firmware updates for affected models. If no update available, consider network isolation of IPMI interfaces or disabling web-based management.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-3608 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-3608 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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