CVE-2013-5011
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnquoted Windows search path vulnerability in the client in Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) 11.x before 11.0.7.4 and 12.x before 12.1.2 RU2 and Endpoint Protection Small Business Edition 12.x before 12.1.2 RU2 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted program in the %SYSTEMDRIVE% directory.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSymantec Endpoint Protection client contains an unquoted Windows service path vulnerability. When the service executes, Windows searches for the service binary without proper path quoting, allowing a local attacker to place a malicious executable with the same name in the %SYSTEMDRIVE% directory. Windows will execute this attacker-controlled program instead of the legitimate service binary, resulting in privilege escalation from low-privileged user to SYSTEM level access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 11.0.7.3= 11.0= 11.0.1= 11.0.2= 11.0.4= 11.0.3001= 11.0.6000= 11.0.6100= 11.0.6200= 11.0.6200.754= 11.0.6300= 11.0.7000CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed Symantec Endpoint Protection versionCheck the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Symantec\SYMEP\Version or run 'wmic product where "name like '%Symantec Endpoint Protection%'" get version'Affected if The version matches 11.0.7.3 or earlier, or equals 11.0, 11.0.1, 11.0.2, 11.0.4, 11.0.3001, 11.0.6000, 11.0.6100, 11.0.6200, 11.0.6200.754, 11.0.6300, or 11.0.7000
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Identify SEP services in Windows registryOpen Registry Editor and navigate to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services, then look for service names containing 'Sep', 'Smc', or 'Symantec' such as SepMasterService, SmcService, or related servicesAffected if Any Symantec Endpoint Protection service exists on the system
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Check service ImagePath for unquoted paths with spacesIn the services registry key from the previous step, examine the ImagePath value for each SEP service. If the path contains spaces and is not enclosed in double quotes, it is unquoted. For example: C:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\smc.exe is unquotedAffected if The ImagePath value contains a space and is not surrounded by quotation marks
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Verify executable location for path injection riskIdentify the directory portion of the unquoted path (e.g., C:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\) and check if any executable files with the same name as the service binary exist in parent directories that Windows would search before the intended location. Also check the %SYSTEMDRIVE% root for files matching the service binary nameAffected if A malicious executable with the service binary name exists in a directory Windows searches before the legitimate location, or in the system drive root
A system is affected if it runs a vulnerable version of Symantec Endpoint Protection (11.0 through 11.0.7.3) AND has any SEP service with an unquoted path in its ImagePath registry value, creating an opportunity for path injection privilege escalation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate Symantec Endpoint Protection to version 11.0.7.4, 12.1.2 RU2, or later which includes the patched service binary with proper path quoting. Alternatively, identify and quote the vulnerable service paths in the registry manually.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-5011 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-5011 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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