CVE-2013-5755
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedconfig/.htpasswd in Yealink IP Phone SIP-T38G has a hardcoded password of (1) user (s7C9Cx.rLsWFA) for the user account, (2) admin (uoCbM.VEiKQto) for the admin account, and (3) var (jhl3iZAe./qXM) for the var account, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via unspecified vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Yealink IP Phone SIP-T38G stores hardcoded passwords in config/.htpasswd for three accounts (user, admin, var). The passwords are stored in a reversible hash format and are publicly known, allowing remote attackers to authenticate to the device with administrative privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelAccess the device's web interface or check the device label to confirm the exact model is Yealink SIP-T38GAffected if The device is a Yealink SIP-T38G (any firmware version)
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Locate the password fileAccess the device via HTTP and navigate to /config/.htpasswd or use FTP/TFTP if enabled to retrieve the config/.htpasswd fileAffected if The file /config/.htpasswd exists and contains entries for user, admin, and var accounts with hashed passwords
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Verify hardcoded credentials are presentCompare the contents of /config/.htpasswd against publicly known hardcoded password hashes for this device (the reversible hashes are documented in public vulnerability references)Affected if The htpasswd file contains the known hardcoded password hashes for any of the three accounts (user, admin, var)
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Test default account accessAttempt to log into the device web interface using the default credentials: admin/admin, user/user, or var/var (or the publicly known hardcoded passwords)Affected if Any of the default accounts (user, admin, var) are accessible using known hardcoded credentials
If the device is a Yealink SIP-T38G and the /config/.htpasswd file contains the documented hardcoded credentials (or default credentials still work), the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately change all default credentials on affected devices and disable unused accounts. For long-term remediation, contact the vendor for a firmware update that removes hardcoded credentials and implements proper credential management.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-5755 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-5755 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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