CVE-2013-6032
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedcgi-bin/postpf/cgi-bin/dynamic/config/config.html on Lexmark X94x before LC.BR.P142, X85x through LC4.BE.P487, X644 and X646 before LC2.MC.P374, X642 through LC2.MB.P318, W840 through LS.HA.P252, T64x before LS.ST.P344, X64xef through LC2.TI.P325, C935dn through LC.JO.P091, C920 through LS.TA.P152, C78x through LC.IO.P187, X78x through LC2.IO.P335, C77x through LC.CM.P052, X772 through LC2.TR.P291, C53x through LS.SW.P069, C52x through LS.FA.P150, 25xxN through LCL.CU.P114, N4000 through LC.MD.P119, N4050e through GO.GO.N206, N70xxe through LC.CO.N309, E450 through LM.SZ.P124, E350 through LE.PH.P129, and E250 through LE.PM.P126 printers allows remote attackers to remove the Password Protect administrative password via the vac.255.GENPASSWORD parameter.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMultiple Lexmark printer models contain a vulnerability in the web interface CGI script (cgi-bin/postpf/cgi-bin/dynamic/config/config.html) that allows remote attackers to remove the Password Protect administrative password by manipulating the vac.255.GENPASSWORD parameter. This authentication bypass grants unauthorized administrative access to the printer's configuration.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= lcl.cu.p114<= ls.fa.p150<= ls.sw.p069<= lc.cm.p052<= lc.io.p187<= ls.ta.p152<= lc.jo.p091<= le.pm.p126CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Lexmark printer modelAccess the printer's web interface and locate the model number in the main page or status section, or query the device via SNMP using: snmpwalk -v2c -c public <IP> sysDescrAffected if Model is one of: 25xxn, C52x, C53x, C77x, C78x, C920, C935dn, or E250
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Check the installed firmware versionIn the printer web interface, navigate to Settings > Firmware or About page to find the firmware version. Alternatively, use SNMP: snmpget -v2c -c public <IP> 1.3.6.1.2.1.43.5.1.1.14.1Affected if Firmware version is at or below: lcl.cu.p114 (25xxn), ls.fa.p150 (C52x), ls.sw.p069 (C53x), lc.cm.p052 (C77x), lc.io.p187 (C78x), ls.ta.p152 (C920), lc.jo.p091 (C935dn), or le.pm.p126 (E250)
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Verify the vulnerable CGI endpoint is accessibleAttempt to access the vulnerable URL path: http://<PRINTER_IP>/cgi-bin/postpf/cgi-bin/dynamic/config/config.html - the page loads if the web interface is enabledAffected if The web interface and the config.html endpoint respond successfully, indicating the vulnerable script is available
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Check if password protection is currently appliedIn the printer web interface, navigate to Settings > Security > Password Protect or similar admin security settings to verify if administrative password protection is enabledAffected if Password protection is enabled and the device firmware version falls within the affected ranges, the device is vulnerable to having this protection removed via the documented parameter manipulation
The device is affected if it is one of the listed Lexmark models running firmware at or below the specified version thresholds and has its web interface accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor-supplied firmware patches (e.g., LC.BR.P142 for X94x series) to all affected devices. If patching is not immediately feasible, restrict network access to the printer web interface to minimize exposure.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2013-6032 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2013-6032 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data