CVE-2014-0175
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedmcollective has a default password set at install
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidencemcollective (Marionette Collective), a server orchestration and configuration management framework, ships with a default password configured during installation. If administrators do not change this default credential, remote attackers can easily authenticate to the mcollective service and execute arbitrary commands on managed nodes.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0= 2.1= 8.0= 10.0all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify mcollective is installedCheck if the mcollective package is installed on the system. On Debian-based systems: dpkg -l | grep mcollective. On RPM-based systems: rpm -qa | grep mcollective. Also check for running mcollective processes: ps aux | grep mcollectiveAffected if mcollective is installed and running without the default password having been changed
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Locate mcollective configuration fileFind the mcollective configuration file, typically named server.cfg or client.cfg, usually located in /etc/mcollective/, /etc/puppetlabs/mcollective/, or the mcollective conf directory. Check common paths: ls /etc/mcollective/server.cfg /etc/puppetlabs/mcollective/server.cfgAffected if The configuration file exists and contains security settings
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Examine security plugin password settingIn the configuration file, look for the security plugin configuration section. Search for lines containing 'password', 'securityprovider', or 'plugin.security' settings. The default password is typically configured under the security plugin section.Affected if A password is configured but still set to the default installation credential rather than a unique strong password
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Verify password has been changed from defaultCompare the configured password value in the security plugin section against the default password that ships with mcollective installation. If the password matches the default value, or if no password has been explicitly set by the administrator, the system is vulnerable.Affected if The password in the configuration file matches the default password or remains unchanged from the mcollective installation default
A user is affected if mcollective is installed and the configured security password has not been changed from the default installation credential.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImmediately change the default password to a strong, unique password in the mcollective configuration files (typically server.cfg or client.cfg) and restart the mcollective services.
- Locate the mcollective configuration file (typically /etc/mcollective/server.cfg or similar)
- Change the default password by setting the 'plugin.mcollective.securityprovider.simple' or 'plugin.psk' parameter to a strong, unique password
- Ensure the client configuration also uses the same password in the 'plugin.psk' setting
- Restart the mcollective service after making changes: systemctl restart mcollective or service mcollective restart
- Verify the service is running with the new credentials
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-0175 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-0175 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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