Telepresence Video Communication ServerHardware / appliance · Cisco

CVE-2014-0675

MEDIUM · 6.4 CVSS v2.0 Published 2014-01-23
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
73/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Expressway component in Cisco TelePresence Video Communication Server (VCS) uses the same default X.509 certificate across different customers' installations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks against SSL sessions by leveraging the certificate's trust relationship, aka Bug ID CSCue07471.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Cisco TelePresence VCS Expressway component ships with a default X.509 certificate that is identical across all customer installations. This shared default certificate undermines the trust model of SSL/TLS, as an attacker who obtains this certificate can impersonate any VCS server still using the default, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against encrypted sessions.

MitigationReplace the default X.509 certificate with a unique, customer-specific certificate issued from a trusted Certificate Authority, and implement certificate pinning or validation controls for client connections.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Telepresence Video Communication ServerHardware / appliance
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
None

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm Cisco TelePresence VCS Expressway is deployed
    Identify whether the Cisco TelePresence Video Communication Server Expressway is installed in your environment. This is the affected product for this vulnerability.
    Affected if The product is present in your environment, meaning all versions are affected by the default certificate issue.
  2. Identify the server certificate currently in use
    Access the VCS administration interface or examine the SSL/TLS certificate configured on the Expressway server. Look at the X.509 certificate being used for HTTPS and SIP TLS connections.
    Affected if The server is using a certificate that was pre-installed by default rather than a unique certificate you obtained from a trusted Certificate Authority.
  3. Verify the certificate is customer-specific
    Check whether the certificate contains a Subject Distinguished Name, Issuer, and Serial Number that matches what would be a default certificate identical across all installations. Look for evidence that a unique, customer-issued certificate has been installed.
    Affected if The certificate shows no signs of being replaced with a unique, customer-specific certificate from a trusted CA, indicating the default shared certificate is still in use.
  4. Confirm certificate uniqueness across deployments
    If you have multiple VCS Expressway installations, compare the certificates in use. If they are identical, this indicates the default certificate is still being used.
    Affected if Multiple VCS Expressway units are using identical certificates, confirming the default shared certificate has not been replaced.

Your environment is affected if the Cisco TelePresence VCS Expressway is using the default X.509 certificate that shipped with the product rather than a unique, customer-specific certificate from a trusted CA.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace the default X.509 certificate with a unique, customer-specific certificate issued from a trusted Certificate Authority, and implement certificate pinning or validation controls for client connections.

Fix this in Telepresence Video Communication Server Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
14.0 hours of engineering $2,480
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-0675 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-0675 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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