CVE-2014-0789
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple buffer overflows in the OPC Automation 2.0 Server Object ActiveX control in Schneider Electric OPC Factory Server (OFS) TLXCDSUOFS33 3.5 and earlier, TLXCDSTOFS33 3.5 and earlier, TLXCDLUOFS33 3.5 and earlier, TLXCDLTOFS33 3.5 and earlier, and TLXCDLFOFS33 3.5 and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via long arguments to unspecified functions.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMultiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the OPC Automation 2.0 Server Object ActiveX control within Schneider Electric OPC Factory Server (OFS) versions 3.5 and earlier across multiple product variants (TLXCDSUOFS33, TLXCDSTOFS33, TLXCDLUOFS33, TLXCDLTOFS33, TLXCDLFOFS33). Attackers can trigger denial of service by passing excessively long arguments to unspecified functions, indicating insufficient bounds checking in the ActiveX control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 3.35<= 3.35<= 3.35<= 3.35<= 3.35CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify if OPC Factory Server is installedCheck Windows installed programs list or look for OFS installation directory (typically in C:\Program Files\Schneider Electric\OPC Factory Server or similar). Use 'Programs and Features' control panel or PowerShell command: Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersionAffected if Schneider Electric OPC Factory Server or any OFS variant (TLXCDSUOFS, TLXCDSTOFS, TLXCDLUOFS, TLXCDLTOFS, TLXCDLFOFS) appears in installed programs
-
Verify the installed OFS versionLocate the OFS installation and check version information. Look for version file in the installation directory or check file properties of the main executable (often named OFS.exe or similar). Compare against the affected version range: <= 3.35 or <= 3.5Affected if The installed version is 3.35 or earlier, or version 3.5 or earlier (the exact cutoff depends on whether 3.5 is vulnerable per the description)
-
Locate the vulnerable ActiveX controlCheck for the OPC Automation 2.0 Server Object ActiveX control (typically registered as OPCAutomation.dll or similar OPC Automation component). Use regedit to search HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT for 'OPCAutomation' or check the Windows\System32 directory for OPC-related DLL filesAffected if The OPC Automation 2.0 ActiveX control (OPCAutomation.dll) is present on the system
-
Confirm the ActiveX control is registered and accessibleUse regsvr32 to check registration status or examine registry keys under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID for the OPC Automation COM object. If the control is registered and internet zone settings permit, it can be invoked from browsers or applicationsAffected if The ActiveX control is registered in Windows registry and accessible (not disabled or blocked)
A system is affected if Schneider Electric OPC Factory Server version 3.5 or earlier is installed and the OPC Automation 2.0 Server Object ActiveX control is present and accessible on the system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor-supplied patch or update to OFS version beyond 3.5. If patching is immediately infeasible, disable or restrict access to the vulnerable ActiveX control and implement network segmentation to limit exposure.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $9,856.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-0789 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-0789 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data