CVE-2014-4009
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSAP CCMS Monitoring (BC-CCM-MON) has hardcoded credentials, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via unspecified vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceSAP CCMS Monitoring (BC-CCM-MON) contains hardcoded credentials embedded in the application code or configuration, which can be discovered by remote attackers through reverse engineering, configuration file access, or other unspecified vectors, allowing them to authenticate to the monitoring system with elevated privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify SAP CCMS Monitoring installationCheck if the BC-CCM-MON component is installed in your SAP system using transaction code SM37, SMICM, or by querying the system component list via SAP transaction code SPAM or SAINTAffected if The BC-CCM-MON component is present in the SAP system
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Locate monitoring configuration filesAccess the CCMS monitoring configuration files in the SAP system. In SAP, navigate to transaction RZ20, expand the CCMS Monitoring tree, and inspect the monitoring agent configuration files. Check directories such as /usr/sap/<SID>/SYS/profile and the CCMS data directory for configuration files containing monitoring agent settingsAffected if Configuration files contain embedded credentials or default password values
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Examine CCMS agent configuration for credentialsReview the CCMS monitoring agent configuration files (typically in the SAPCCMSR.INI, sapccmsr.ini, or similar configuration files in the SAPM directories) for hardcoded username and password entries. Use transaction code RZ20 to access monitoring agent configuration and search for password, credential, or authentication-related parametersAffected if Hardcoded usernames and passwords are found in monitoring agent configuration files
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Check monitoring user accountsReview all CCMS monitoring users defined in the SAP system via transaction code SU01 or using the CCMS transaction codes. Look for default monitoring users that may have hardcoded or default passwords applied across the monitoring infrastructureAffected if Default monitoring users with static or hardcoded passwords exist in the system
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Inspect web service configurationsIf CCMS monitoring includes web service endpoints or RFC connections, examine the configuration via transaction code SM59 for RFC destinations and SOAMANAGER for web service configurations. Look for stored credentials with hardcoded authentication dataAffected if RFC destinations or web service configurations contain hardcoded credentials
The environment is affected if SAP CCMS Monitoring (BC-CCM-MON) component is installed and any hardcoded or default credentials are found in its configuration files, monitoring agents, or user accounts.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the relevant SAP security patch for CVE-2014-4009 and replace all hardcoded credentials with dynamic, role-based authentication mechanisms or secure credential management practices.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $10,240.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-4009 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-4009 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data