CVE-2014-4068
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Response Group Service in Microsoft Lync Server 2010 and 2013 and the Core Components in Lync Server 2013 do not properly handle exceptions, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon hang) via a crafted call, aka "Lync Denial of Service Vulnerability."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability exists in the Response Group Service in Microsoft Lync Server 2010 and 2013, and in Core Components of Lync Server 2013. The issue stems from improper exception handling when the service processes incoming calls. Remote attackers can send crafted calls to trigger unhandled exceptions, causing the Response Group Service daemon to hang and become unavailable, resulting in a denial of service condition.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2010= 2013CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Lync Server versionCheck the installed version of Microsoft Lync Server on the system using Add/Remove Programs, installed programs list, or by querying the Lync Server installation via PowerShell (Get-CsServerVersion or checking registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ServerWare\Lync)Affected if The installed version is Lync Server 2010 or Lync Server 2013 (any build within these versions)
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Verify Response Group Service is enabledCheck if the Response Group Service (RGS) is provisioned and enabled in the Lync Server topology. Use Lync Server Management Shell to run Get-CsRgsConfiguration or check the status via the Lync Server Deployment WizardAffected if The Response Group Service is enabled and configured in the Lync Server deployment
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Confirm Response Group Service is runningCheck the status of the Response Group Service on the Lync front-end servers. Use Services.msc to locate 'Lync Server Response Group Service' or run Get-Service 'RGS*' in PowerShellAffected if The Response Group Service is currently running on the server
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Determine if RGS is network-exposedCheck if the server is listening on ports typically used by the Response Group Service (such as port 5061 for SIP or port 5070 for RGS). Use netstat -an or Test-NetConnection to verify open listening ports associated with RGSAffected if The RGS ports are open and listening on network interfaces accessible from untrusted networks
A system is affected if it runs Lync Server 2010 or 2013 with the Response Group Service enabled, running, and exposed to network traffic where remote attackers could send crafted calls.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the relevant Microsoft security update (MS14-036 or subsequent cumulative updates) to address the improper exception handling in Lync Server. Until patched, consider network-level filtering to limit exposure of the Response Group Service to untrusted networks and implement monitoring for service availability.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-4068 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-4068 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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