CVE-2014-5726
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Security Service myBranch App (aka com.tyfone.ssfcu.mbanking) application 7.88.00.145 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe myBranch Android banking application version 7.88.00.145 fails to validate X.509 certificates from SSL servers, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept encrypted communications by presenting forged certificates and steal sensitive user data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.88.00.145CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed myBranch app versionOn Android device: Go to Settings > Apps > myBranch (or Ssfcu Security Service Mybranch), check the Version field under App Info. Alternatively, use adb shell pm list packages -f | grep mybranch to locate the APK and its version info.Affected if The installed version number equals exactly 7.88.00.145
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Confirm the app makes SSL/TLS network connectionsCheck if the myBranch app has network activity by monitoring with a network proxy (like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP) or using Android's netstat commands. Observe whether the app attempts HTTPS connections to its banking servers.Affected if The app successfully makes HTTPS requests without certificate validation errors or warnings, indicating SSL is used but validation is broken
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Test for missing certificate validationConfigure a man-in-the-middle proxy with an invalid/forged certificate and attempt to intercept the app's traffic. If the app accepts the invalid certificate without warning or error, certificate validation is not properly implemented.Affected if The app accepts invalid or forged SSL certificates during MITM testing, allowing interception of encrypted traffic
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Verify certificate pinning is absentExamine the app's network security configuration or code (APK analysis) for certificate pinning implementations. Look for custom TrustManager implementations, pinned certificates in the code, or network_security_config.xml with pin-set configurations.Affected if No certificate pinning or custom TrustManager is found in the app's code or configuration
A user is affected if the installed myBranch/Ssfcu Security Service Mybranch app version is exactly 7.88.00.145 and the app accepts invalid SSL certificates without validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper SSL/TLS certificate validation using trusted CA stores, certificate pinning, or robust hostname verification in all network requests within the application.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-5726 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-5726 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data