CVE-2014-5885
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Disaster Alert (aka disasterAlert.PDC) application 3.2 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Disaster Alert Android application version 3.2 fails to validate X.509 certificates when establishing SSL/TLS connections, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept sensitive data by presenting fraudulent certificates.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check if Disaster Alert app is installedOn the Android device, go to Settings > Apps > Apps manager and search for 'Disaster Alert' or 'Pdc Disaster Alert'. Alternatively, use ADB command: `adb shell pm list packages | grep -i disaster`Affected if The app named 'Disaster Alert' or 'Pdc Disaster Alert' is found on the device
-
Verify the installed version is 3.2In Settings > Apps > Apps manager > Disaster Alert, look at the Version field under App info. Or use ADB: `adb shell dumpsys package pdc.disasteralert.net` and check the versionNameAffected if The version listed is exactly 3.2
-
Confirm SSL certificate validation vulnerability existsThis requires static or dynamic analysis of the app binary. Use a decompiler (e.g., jadx) to examine the source code for SSL/TLS connection handling. Look for HTTP client implementations (such as Apache HttpClient, HttpURLConnection, or OkHttp) and check if certificate validation is properly implemented (e.g., check for custom TrustManager or hostname verifier that bypasses validation)Affected if Code inspection reveals SSL connections are established without proper X.509 certificate chain validation, or a custom TrustManager accepts all certificates
If the Disaster Alert app version 3.2 is installed on your device and the app code does not properly validate SSL/TLS certificates during network connections, then your environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper SSL certificate chain validation and consider certificate pinning to ensure the app only trusts expected certificates from legitimate servers.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,328.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-5885 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-5885 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data