CVE-2014-6434
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedgpExec in GoPro HERO 3+ allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a the (1) a1 or (2) a2 parameter in a restart action.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe gpExec functionality in GoPro HERO 3+ cameras contains a command injection vulnerability. Remote attackers can execute arbitrary operating system commands by supplying them through the a1 or a2 HTTP parameters in a restart action to the gpExec endpoint. This is a pre-authentication flaw with CVSS 10 severity, allowing complete system compromise without credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3\+= 3\+CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelAccess the camera's web interface or check the device label/metadata to confirm it is a GoPro HERO 3+ modelAffected if Device is a GoPro HERO 3+ camera
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Check firmware versionAccess the camera's web interface or use the GoPro app to view the firmware version informationAffected if Firmware version is 3+ (the only versions available for this model)
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Verify web interface is enabledAttempt to access the camera's web interface via HTTP on the local network (typically at the camera's IP address)Affected if Web interface responds and is accessible on the network
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Confirm gpExec endpoint existsSend an HTTP request to the gpExec endpoint (typically /gpExec) on the camera's web server and observe if it respondsAffected if The gpExec endpoint responds to HTTP requests (indicating the vulnerable functionality is present)
If you have a GoPro HERO 3+ camera with firmware version 3+ and its web interface is accessible on the network, your device is affected by this pre-authentication command injection vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataNetwork segmentation to isolate the camera from untrusted networks, disabling the camera's web interface if unused, and placing behind a firewall. Since this is a legacy device (HERO 3+), verify if GoPro still provides firmware updates; if not, replace with a supported model.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-6434 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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