CVE-2014-6741
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe John MacArthur (aka com.john.macarthur) application 1.0.26 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe John MacArthur Android application version 1.0.26 fails to validate X.509 certificates from SSL servers, enabling man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept communications by presenting fraudulent certificates. This allows credential theft and session hijacking through a classic SSL stripping attack vector.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0.26CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed version of the John Macarthur appOn the Android device, go to Settings > Apps > Tribunenews365 John Macarthur (or John MacArthur) and check the version number under App InfoAffected if The installed version is exactly 1.0.26
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Inspect the app for custom TrustManager implementationDecompile the APK using apktool or similar, then examine the Smali/Java code for any custom TrustManager class. Search for 'TrustManager' in the source code and check if a custom implementation exists that bypasses standard validationAffected if No custom TrustManager is implemented OR a custom TrustManager that skips certificate chain validation is found (e.g., accepts all certificates)
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Check for certificate pinning implementationExamine the app's source code for certificate pinning logic - look for implementations using CertificatePinner (OkHttp), custom key store configuration, or explicit certificate hash validationAffected if No certificate pinning is implemented for the app's network connections
You are affected if the Tribunenews365 John Macarthur app version 1.0.26 is installed and it lacks proper certificate validation (no custom TrustManager with chain validation) and certificate pinning for secure communications.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper certificate validation using a custom TrustManager that validates the certificate chain, or employ certificate pinning for known server certificates. All network communications should require valid SSL/TLS certificates before transmitting sensitive data.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,480.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-6741 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-6741 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data