CVE-2014-6950
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Mt. Airy News (aka com.soln.SBE4A803AD6430A6E9DBA5688AA644148) application 1.0069.b0069 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Mt. Airy News Android application fails to validate X.509 certificates when establishing SSL/TLS connections with backend servers. Without proper certificate chain validation and hostname verification, the app accepts any certificate presented by a server, enabling man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept, modify, or steal sensitive data transmitted between the app and legitimate servers.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0069.b0069CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify installed application versionOn the Android device, go to Settings > Apps > Mt. Airy News, or use ADB command: adb shell pm list packages -v | grep -i 'airy' to retrieve the installed version name and version code.Affected if The installed version is 1.0069.b0069 exactly, as this is the single affected version listed for this CVE.
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Confirm app accepts invalid SSL certificatesSet up a man-in-the-middle proxy (such as Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP, or mitmproxy) with an invalid or self-signed certificate. Configure the device to trust this proxy certificate, then attempt to intercept traffic while the app communicates with its backend server.Affected if The app successfully establishes connections and transmits data through the proxy without any certificate validation errors or warnings, indicating the app does not validate the server certificate chain.
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Inspect SSL validation implementation in app codeObtain the APK file (via ADB pull or alternative method), then decompile using tools such as jadx, apktool, or Androguard. Search the decompiled source code for SSL/TLS handling classes, specifically looking for implementations of TrustManager,HostnameVerifier, or X509TrustManager interfaces.Affected if The code contains custom TrustManager or HostnameVerifier implementations that unconditionally accept all certificates or all hostnames (for example, implementations that always return true from verify() methods or empty implementations of checkClientTrusted/checkServerTrusted).
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Check for absence of certificate pinningUsing the decompiled APK from the previous step, search the source code for certificate pinning implementations using keywords such as 'pin', 'pinning', 'SHA256', 'PublicKey', or examine the network security configuration files for pin-set definitions.Affected if No certificate pinning logic is found, and the app relies solely on the default system TrustManager without any additional pinning layer for critical endpoints.
A user is affected if the installed Mt. Airy News Android app version is exactly 1.0069.b0069 and testing confirms the app accepts invalid certificates or lacks proper certificate chain validation in its code.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper SSL/TLS certificate validation including chain-of-trust verification and hostname matching; consider certificate pinning for critical endpoints to prevent MITM attacks.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-6950 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-6950 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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