CVE-2014-7086
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Killer Screen lock (aka com.cc.theme.shashou) application 0.5 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Killer Screen Lock Android application version 0.5 fails to validate X.509 certificates from SSL servers, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept communications by presenting fraudulent certificates and capture sensitive data transmitted between the app and legitimate servers.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 0.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify if Killer Screen Lock app is installedOn the Android device, go to Settings > Apps > Downloaded (or All) and look for 'Killer Screen Lock' in the application list, or use a terminal command: pm list packages | grep killerAffected if The app 'Killer Screen Lock' is found in installed applications
-
Check the installed application versionIn Settings > Apps > Killer Screen Lock, view the 'Version' or 'Version code' field under app information; alternatively, use: pm dump <package_name> | grep versionAffected if The installed version is exactly 0.5
-
Verify the app uses network connectionsUse Android's built-in network monitor (Data Usage in Settings) to see if Killer Screen Lock has any network activity, or examine the app's AndroidManifest.xml for INTERNET permissionAffected if The app holds INTERNET permission and shows network traffic activity
-
Confirm SSL/TLS connections are usedExamine the app's network traffic using a proxy (like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP) with the device configured to route traffic through the proxy, or decompile the APK and inspect source code for HTTPS/SSL usage in network callsAffected if The app makes HTTPS requests to external servers without proper certificate validation
-
Test for certificate validation failureSet up a man-in-the-middle proxy with an invalid/fraudulent certificate and attempt to intercept traffic from the app; if the app connects successfully without certificate warning, validation is missingAffected if The app accepts connections when presented with an invalid or self-signed certificate, completing HTTPS requests without rejection
A user is affected if Killer Screen Lock version 0.5 is installed and the app transmits sensitive data over HTTPS connections without validating server certificates, allowing interception by attackers presenting fraudulent certificates.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate the application to implement proper SSL certificate chain validation using Android's built-in certificate pinning or trust manager implementation, ensuring all HTTPS connections verify server certificates before establishing trusted connections.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-7086 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-7086 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data