CVE-2014-7447
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Dattch - The Lesbian App (aka com.dattch.dattch.app) application 0.30 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Dattch Android app version 0.30 fails to validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept and modify traffic by presenting forged certificates. This enables credential theft and session hijacking.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 0.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Dattch app is installedOn Android devices, check installed applications list via Settings > Apps > All Apps, or use ADB command: adb shell pm list packages | grep dattchAffected if The Dattch app package is found on any managed device
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Check installed app versionIn Android Settings > Apps > Dattch > Version info, or use ADB: adb shell dumpsys package com.dattch.android | grep versionNameAffected if The version shown is 0.3 or 0.30
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Test SSL/TLS certificate validationConfigure a MITM proxy such as Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP on the same network, install the proxy CA certificate on the device, and attempt to intercept traffic from the Dattch appAffected if The app successfully connects and transmits data through the proxy without certificate errors, indicating missing certificate validation
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Verify certificate chain and hostname verificationUse a network traffic analysis tool to inspect whether the app properly validates the server certificate chain and hostname during SSL/TLS handshakesAffected if The app accepts connections even when presented with a mismatched or self-signed certificate
A user is affected if they have Dattch Android app version 0.3 installed and the app accepts forged or invalid SSL/TLS certificates during connections, allowing traffic interception.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThe app must be updated to implement proper certificate chain validation, hostname verification, and consider certificate pinning for sensitive endpoints.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-7447 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-7447 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data