CVE-2014-7783
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Bill G. Bennett (aka com.billgbennett) application 1.0 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Bill G. Bennett Android application version 1.0 fails to perform X.509 certificate validation when establishing SSL/TLS connections with remote servers. This allows an attacker on the same network to intercept traffic by presenting a fraudulent certificate, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks and potential theft of sensitive data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Bill G. Bennett app is installedCheck device or Play Store for app named 'Billgbennett Bill G. Bennett' or package identifier related to this app. Use 'adb shell pm list packages' or check installed apps on the Android device.Affected if The app with package name corresponding to Billgbennett Bill G. Bennett version 1.0 is installed on the device.
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Confirm app makes network connectionsUse network monitoring tools (like packet capture or Android Studio Network Profiler) to observe if the app communicates with remote servers over HTTPS or HTTP.Affected if The app transmits data to remote servers, especially over SSL/TLS connections.
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Inspect app code for certificate validation logicDecompile the APK using tools like apktool or jadx, then examine source code for HTTPS/URLConnection/HttpClient implementations. Look for implementations that disable certificate validation (e.g., TrustManager that accepts all certificates, hostname verification disabled, or custom SSLSocketFactory that bypasses validation).Affected if Code contains custom TrustManager implementations that accept all certificates, or disables hostname verification, or uses custom SSL sockets without proper validation.
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Check AndroidManifest.xml for network permissionsReview the decompiled AndroidManifest.xml for INTERNET permission and any network security configuration. Check if the app defines a custom network_security_config that disables certificate validation.Affected if App has INTERNET permission and potentially a network security config that weakens SSL/TLS validation.
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Test for MITM vulnerability with proxyConfigure an Android device with a proxy (like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP) and attempt to intercept SSL/TLS traffic from the app. If the app successfully establishes connections through the proxy without certificate errors, validation is likely bypassed.Affected if App successfully proxies HTTPS traffic through an untrusted certificate, indicating certificate validation is not properly enforced.
A user is affected if the Billgbennett Bill G. Bennett app version 1.0 is installed and the app either disables SSL certificate validation in its code or accepts certificates from untrusted sources, allowing traffic interception.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper SSL certificate validation by either validating the full certificate chain to trusted CAs, implementing certificate pinning for expected server certificates, or using Android's Network Security Configuration to enforce certificate validation.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-7783 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-7783 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data