Meraki Mr FirmwareApplication · Cisco
CVE-2014-7999
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco-Meraki MS, MR, and MX devices with firmware before 2014-09-24 allow remote authenticated users to install arbitrary firmware by leveraging unspecified HTTP handler access on the local network, aka Cisco-Meraki defect ID 00478565.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability allows remote authenticated users on the local network to install arbitrary firmware on Cisco-Meraki MS (switches), MR (access points), and MX (security appliances) devices by exploiting an unspecified HTTP handler. An attacker with valid credentials could potentially replace the device firmware with a malicious version, compromising the entire network infrastructure.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Meraki Mr FirmwareApplication
<= 2014-09-24
Meraki MrHardware / appliance
all versions
Meraki Ms FirmwareApplication
<= 2014-09-24
Meraki MsHardware / appliance
all versions
Meraki Mx FirmwareApplication
<= 2014-09-24
Meraki MxHardware / appliance
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:A/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Meraki device modelLocate the device and determine if it is an MS (switch), MR (access point), or MX (security appliance). This is typically visible on the physical device label or in the Meraki Dashboard under Inventory.Affected if The device is any Cisco Meraki MS, MR, or MX model.
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Check the installed firmware version and dateAccess the Meraki Dashboard and navigate to the device's firmware information, or log into the device directly via web interface or CLI to retrieve the firmware version and build date. Compare this date to 2014-09-24.Affected if The firmware build date is on or before 2014-09-24.
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Verify if HTTP management interface is enabledCheck the device network settings or Meraki Dashboard under Access Policy to confirm whether HTTP (unencrypted) management access is allowed, as the vulnerability exploits an HTTP handler.Affected if HTTP management access is enabled and the firmware is outdated.
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Assess network accessibility of the management interfaceDetermine if the device management interface is reachable from the local network or VLANs where untrusted users reside, since the attack requires authenticated access from the local network.Affected if The management interface is exposed to local network segments with untrusted users and the firmware is outdated.
The environment is affected if any Cisco Meraki MS, MR, or MX device is running firmware dated 2014-09-24 or earlier and has its management interface accessible to authenticated users on the local network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade all Cisco-Meraki MS, MR, and MX devices to firmware released on or after 2014-09-24. Prior to upgrading, inventory all affected devices, verify compatibility, schedule maintenance windows, and back up current configurations.
Fix this in Meraki Mr Firmware
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,880.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-7999 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-7999 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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