CVE-2014-9265
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedStack-based buffer overflow in the BackupToAvi method in the CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control in Samsung SmartViewer allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the BackupToAvi method of the CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control in Samsung SmartViewer. Remote attackers can exploit this by overflowing a stack buffer via unspecified vectors, potentially executing arbitrary code on the target system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Samsung SmartViewer installationCheck Program Files folder for Samsung SmartViewer directory, or look for it in Add/Remove Programs (Programs and Features) on WindowsAffected if Samsung SmartViewer is present on the system
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Locate CNC_Ctrl ActiveX controlSearch for CNC_Ctrl.dll or CNC_Ctrl.ocx in the SmartViewer installation directory, or check registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Code Store Database\Installed Components for CNC_CtrlAffected if The CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control file exists on the system
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Verify ActiveX control is registeredRun 'regsvr32 /s CNC_Ctrl.dll' or check registry keys under HKCR\CLSID for the CNC_Ctrl CLSID to confirm registration statusAffected if The CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control is registered as an ActiveX component
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Check if control is accessible to browsersInspect registered CLSIDs in Internet Explorer settings (Internet Options > Security > Custom Level > ActiveX controls and plugins) or check for kill bits in registryAffected if The CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control is not blocked (no kill bit set) and is marked safe for scripting
If Samsung SmartViewer with the CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control is installed and the control is not disabled or killed, the system is affected since all versions of SmartViewer are vulnerable to this flaw.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply available vendor patches from Samsung for SmartViewer, or disable/remove the vulnerable CNC_Ctrl ActiveX control if no patch is available. Network-level segmentation can reduce exposure to remote attackers.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2014-9265 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2014-9265 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data