CVE-2015-0565
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedNaCl in 2015 allowed the CLFLUSH instruction, making rowhammer attacks possible.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceGoogle's Native Client (NaCl) sandbox allowed the CLFLUSH CPU instruction, which could be exploited to perform rowhammer attacks by rapidly flushing cache lines to trigger bit flips in adjacent DRAM rows.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2015CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Google Native Client installationCheck for NaCl presence on the system. On Linux, search for nacl or nativeclient in common paths such as /usr/lib/nacl, /opt/google/chrome/resources/nacl, or within Chrome's installation directory. On Windows, check Chrome's installation folder (typically C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\resources\) for nacl modules.Affected if Google Native Client files are found on the system
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Identify NaCl versionIf NaCl is installed, determine its version. For Chrome-integrated NaCl, run 'chrome://version' in Chrome browser and note the Chrome version (NaCl version typically aligns with Chrome's release year). For standalone NaCl, check the version string in the executable or library files.Affected if The version corresponds to the 2015 release year (approximately Chrome 40-50 series)
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Verify CLFLUSH instruction availabilityThis requires examining NaCl's instruction validation. If you have access to NaCl's source or compiled validator, check the instruction whitelist/blacklist. In practice, this check is difficult for end users without access to NaCl internals or debugging tools.Affected if CLFLUSH instruction passes NaCl's instruction validation and is executable within the sandbox
The environment is affected if Google Native Client from the 2015 release year is installed and the CLFLUSH instruction is not blocked by the instruction validator.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict or block the CLFLUSH instruction in NaCl's instruction validation layer to prevent rowhammer-based exploitation within the sandbox environment.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation20.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-0565 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-0565 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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