CVE-2015-0670
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe default configuration of Cisco Small Business IP phones SPA 300 7.5.5 and SPA 500 7.5.5 does not properly support authentication, which allows remote attackers to read audio-stream data or originate telephone calls via a crafted XML request, aka Bug ID CSCuo52482.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability in Cisco Small Business IP phones SPA 300 and SPA 500 (version 7.5.5) stems from the default configuration not properly implementing authentication. Attackers can send crafted XML requests to the phone's web interface without credentials, enabling them to either intercept audio stream data (confidentiality impact) or originate outbound telephone calls (integrity impact). The attack is network-based and requires no authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.5.5all versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the phone model and firmware versionAccess the phone's web administration interface (typically http://<phone-ip>/) and navigate to the Admin or System Status page to view the model number and running firmware version. Alternatively, use the phone's LCD screen menu under Admin Settings > Product Info.Affected if The model is any Cisco SPA 300 or SPA 500 series (SPA500, SPA501g, SPA502g, SPA504g, SPA508g, SPA509g, SPA512g, SPA514g) and the firmware is version 7.5.5 or any version for the models listed as 'all versions'.
-
Verify web interface network accessibilityConfirm whether the phone's web management interface is reachable from network segments other than trusted management VLANs. Attempt to access http://<phone-ip>/ from a non-trusted network location or scan the phone's IP for open HTTP/HTTPS ports.Affected if The web interface is exposed to untrusted network segments, making it reachable by potential attackers.
-
Check if XML request handling is enabledLog into the phone's web admin interface and locate the XML or Remote Management settings (typically under Administration > XML Service or similar). Verify whether the service allows unauthenticated XML requests.Affected if XML service or remote XML request handling is enabled without requiring authentication credentials.
-
Confirm authentication is enforced on web interfaceNavigate to the phone's security or administrator settings and verify that web access authentication is enabled. Attempt to access privileged functions or XML endpoints without providing credentials.Affected if The web interface allows access to administrative functions or XML endpoints without requiring valid authentication credentials (default/unconfigured state).
Your environment is affected if you are running any Cisco SPA 300 or SPA 500 series phone on firmware 7.5.5 or all versions for the specific models listed, with the web interface network-accessible and XML request handling enabled without authentication enforcement.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnable proper authentication on the phone web interface and disable unauthenticated XML request handling. Alternatively, network-segment phone management interfaces to restrict access to trusted management stations only. Apply any available vendor firmware updates.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,880.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-0670 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-0670 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data