CVE-2015-0980
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFormat string vulnerability in BACnOPCServer.exe in the SOAP web interface in SCADA Engine BACnet OPC Server before 2.1.371.24 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in a request.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA format string vulnerability exists in the BACnOPCServer.exe SOAP web interface component of SCADA Engine BACnet OPC Server. Remote attackers can inject format string specifiers into requests to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability affects versions prior to 2.1.371.24.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.1.359.22CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the BACnOPCServer.exe fileSearch the system for BACnOPCServer.exe, typically found in the SCADA Engine installation directory (commonly C:\Program Files\SCADA Engine\BACnet OPC Server\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\SCADA Engine\BACnet OPC Server\)Affected if The file exists on the system indicating the software is installed
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Check the installed version of BACnOPCServer.exeRight-click BACnOPCServer.exe, select Properties, then view the Details tab to find the File Version. Alternatively, run 'wmic datafile where "name='C:\\Program Files\\SCADA Engine\\BACnet OPC Server\\BACnOPCServer.exe'" get Version' (adjust path as needed)Affected if The version number is 2.1.359.22 or lower, meaning it is within the affected range (versions prior to 2.1.371.24)
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Verify the SOAP web interface component is enabledCheck the BACnet OPC Server configuration files or service settings for SOAP/HTTP web service bindings. Look for configuration entries in the server's .ini or .xml config files that enable the SOAP web interface serviceAffected if The SOAP web interface is enabled and listening on HTTP, as this is the attack vector for the format string injection
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Check network exposure of the SOAP serviceReview firewall rules or network configuration to determine if port 8080 (default SOAP port) or configured HTTP port is exposed to untrusted networks. Run 'netstat -an | findstr LISTENING' to identify listening ports associated with the BACnOPCServer processAffected if The SOAP HTTP port is accessible from untrusted network segments, allowing remote attackers to reach the vulnerable interface
The system is affected if SCADA Engine BACnet OPC Server is installed with version 2.1.359.22 or lower AND the SOAP web interface component is enabled and accessible on the network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate SCADA Engine BACnet OPC Server to version 2.1.371.24 or later. Until patched, isolate the affected system's SOAP interface behind a firewall or VPN to reduce attack surface.
BACnet OPC Server 2.1.371.24
- Identify all systems running SCADA Engine BACnet OPC Server version 2.1.359.22 or earlier
- Obtain BACnet OPC Server version 2.1.371.24 or later from the official vendor (SCADA Engine)
- Backup the current server configuration and data before proceeding
- Stop the BACnOPCServer.exe service
- Install the upgraded version (2.1.371.24 or later)
- Restart the BACnOPCServer.exe service
- Verify the SOAP web interface is functioning correctly
- Confirm the format string vulnerability is remediated by testing the SOAP endpoint
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-0980 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-0980 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data