CVE-2015-1597
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Siemens SPCanywhere application for Android does not use encryption during the loading of code, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code by modifying the client-server data stream.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Siemens SPCanywhere Android application loads code without encryption, allowing man-in-the-middle attackers to intercept and modify the client-server data stream to inject and execute arbitrary code on the device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.4.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed SPCanywhere versionOpen Android Settings > Apps > SPCanywhere and note the version number displayed under App Info, or use ADB command: `adb shell dumpsys package com.siemens.spcanywhere | grep versionName`Affected if The displayed version is 1.4.1 or earlier
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Verify code loading feature is activeExamine the SPCanywhere app configuration for any remote code loading, script loading, or dynamic code execution settings in the app's preferences or configuration files located in /data/data/com.siemens.spcanywhere/Affected if Code loading or dynamic code execution feature is enabled or configured
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Inspect network traffic for encryptionUse a network proxy tool (such as Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP) to intercept SPCanywhere traffic while the app communicates with its server. Check if the code loading requests use unencrypted HTTP instead of HTTPS/TLSAffected if Code loading requests travel over unencrypted HTTP (port 80) rather than encrypted HTTPS/TLS (port 443)
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Check app permissionsReview SPCanywhere permissions using `adb shell dumpsys package com.siemens.spcanywhere | grep permission` to identify if the app has permissions enabling network interception or code injectionAffected if The app has excessive network permissions that facilitate MITM attacks
You are affected if SPCanywhere version is 1.4.1 or earlier AND the code loading feature is enabled with unencrypted network communications.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement TLS/SSL encryption for all code loading communications, add code signing verification to ensure loaded code integrity, and use secure channels for all client-server data transfers.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation20.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA5.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $11,520.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2015-1597 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2015-1597 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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